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Political Patronage and North Carolina Law: Is Political
Conformity with the Sheriff a Permissible Job Requirement for
Deputies?

INTRODUCTION

Soon after his election as Sheriff of Buncombe County, North
Carolina, Bobby Lee Medford terminated the employment of several
deputy sheriffs who failed to support his election campaign.' The
deputies, who had been performing their duties in a satisfactory
manner, 2 claimed that three factors prompted their dismissals: their
failure to support Medford's election; their support of his opponents;3
campaign.
and their failure to associate politically with Medford's
The deputies sued in federal court, arguing that by dismissing them
for those reasons, Medford violated their rights of political belief,
speech, and association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.4 In Jenkins v. Medford, the Fourth
Circuit disagreed with the deputies' contention 5 and, relying on
precedent from the United States Supreme Court, held that, under
federal law, North Carolina deputy sheriffs may be terminated on
political grounds 6 when either campaign activity or party affiliation
forms the basis for the dismissal.7
8
The facts of Jenkins describe a system of political patronage,
where partisan politics often collide with individual freedoms. After
1. Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156,1158 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane).
2. Jenkins v. Medford, No. 95-CV126, 1995 WL 914528, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 18,

1996).
3. Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1158.
4. Id at 1160. Plaintiffs brought the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). They also
filed a supplemental claim under North Carolina state law. Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1160.
5. The court relied on Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), and Elrod v. Burns, 427

U.S. 347 (1976).
6. 119 F.3d at 1164. The holding was limited to deputies who are sworn law
enforcement officers. Id at 1165. However, this limitation has little significance, because
all deputy sheriffs in North Carolina are sworn law enforcement officers. N.C. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 12, r. 10B.0103(14) (June 2000).
7. Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1164.

8. In its most general sense, political patronage, or the "spoils" system, constitutes

the exchange of discretionary governmental favors for political support. See CARL
RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 79 (2d ed. 1920); MARTIN &
SUSAN TOLCHIN,

To

THE VICTOR...

324-26 (1971). Patronage often is associated with

government employment. E.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990)
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Jenkins, deputy sheriffs in North Carolina who are dismissed solely
for their party affiliation or campaign activity have no remedy under
federal law in federal court. The Fourth Circuit left little to
implication in this regard.9
Deputies subjected to patronage
dismissals must now find their relief, if any, in North Carolina state
court.' Whether or to what extent patronage dismissals of deputy
sheriffs are permissible under North Carolina law remains an open
question," but the issue is likely to be litigated soon. 2 Eventually,
(discussing an Illinois governor who used political considerations in hiring, rehiring,
transferring, and promoting public employees). But it can also occur in the allotment of
government contracts. E.g., O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712,
715-16 (1996) (describing a city's removal of a trucking company from a list of contractors
because of failure to support the campaign of the incumbent mayor and for supporting the
opposing candidate). Patronage has existed in the United States since the early days of
the Republic. See FISH, supra, at 29; TOLCHIN, supra, at 323. At least as early as the
Jefferson administration, presidents regularly practiced patronage. See FISH, supra, at 29;
TOLCHIN, supra, at 323. After its inception in America, political patronage was frowned
upon, however. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Paine to the Citizens of Pennsylvania on the
Proposal for Calling a Convention (Aug. 1805), reprinted in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS PAINE 997 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945) ("Patronage has a natural tendency to
increase the public expense...."); Letter from George Washington to Mary Wooster
(May 21, 1789) reprinted in FISH, supra, at 7 ("I must be permitted, with the best lights I
can obtain, and upon a general view of characters and circumstances, to nominate such
persons alone to offices, as in my judgment shall be the best qualified to discharge the
functions of the departments to which they shall be appointed."). In 1883, Congress
expressed its displeasure with the patronage system by enacting the Pendleton Act, which
limited the use of patronage considerations in federal government jobs. Pendleton Act,
ch. 27, § 2, 22 Stat. 403, 403-04 (1883). North Carolina followed Congress's lead and
enacted a civil service reform act of its own. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-14.2 (1999)
(limiting patronage in political hiring).
9. Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1165 (holding that deputies in North Carolina may be
terminated for political reasons such as their party affiliation or campaign involvement).
Deputies in other states within the Fourth Circuit will suffer a similar fate. E.g., Mills v.
Meadows, 187 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (applying Jenkins to a Maryland
deputy sheriff). On the other hand, employees of North Carolina sheriffs who are not law
enforcement officers are protected from patronage dismissals. See Knight v. Vernon, 214
F.3d 544, 548 (2000) (en banc) (holding that a North Carolina jailer cannot be dismissed
for patronage reasons).
10. It would be difficult to establish federal jurisdiction for a patronage dismissal
claim. In light of Jenkins, any federal question claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994 & Supp. V
1999), would be dismissed under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and supplemental claims under
state law, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), also would be dismissed. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Establishing diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. V
1999), is not likely because both parties, the deputy and the sheriff, will likely be citizens
of North Carolina.
11. No appellate opinions directly address this issue. Moreover, the only section of
the North Carolina General Statutes that appears to speak to the issue is unclear both in
its application to sheriffs or deputies, and the extent to which it prohibits patronage. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-99 (1999). For further discussion of this statute, see infra notes
133-86 and accompanying text.
12. Sheriffs' elections occur every four years in each of North Carolina's 100 counties.
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some sheriff will decide to terminate a deputy for political reasons,
3
either in the belief that it is legally permissible, or under the guise of
a permitted reason. 4
This Comment discusses the extent to which North Carolina
sheriffs may, consistent with North Carolina law, use political
patronage as a basis for employment decisions regarding deputy
sheriffs.1 5 This Comment proposes that, rather than a blanket
exclusion of all deputies from the protections against patronage
practices, North Carolina courts should examine the nature and scope
of the individual deputy's duties and responsibilities and the character
of the political activity in question to decide whether patronage,
under those circumstances, is an appropriate job requirement.
Part I of this Comment examines United States Supreme Court

decisions dealing with the constitutionality of patronage practices in
public employment 6 and freedom of speech in the public employee
context. 17 Part II analyzes the United States Courts of Appeals'

disagreement in applying Supreme Court precedent to patronage
practices in the employment of deputy sheriffs.' 8 Part III focuses on
North Carolina statutory law, the common law at-will employment
9
doctrine, and their application to deputy sheriffs.' Specifically, part

III analyzes a particular statutory provision and the possible
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 162-1, 153A-10 (1999). Thus, some potential exists for lawsuits arising
out of changes in sheriffs' administrations.
13. See STEPHEN ALLRED, EMPLOYMENT LAW: A GUIDE FOR NORTH CAROLINA
PUBLIC EMPLOYERS 287 (3d ed. 1999) (noting the likelihood that Jenkins will encourage
patronage practices). Jenkins appears to approve of patronage practices. See 119 F.3d at
1156. Indeed, Jenkins overruled a prior decision that held the practice of terminating
deputies because of political affiliation unconstitutional. I& at 1164 (citing Jones v.
Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1984)). The court explained that the prior decision had
created an obstacle to effective law enforcement. 119 F.3d at 1164. Even after the Jones
decision, patronage dismissals continued. See, e.g., Joyner v. Lancaster, 815 F.2d 20, 22
(4th Cir. 1987) (explaining that an incumbent sheriff allegedly fired a deputy for
supporting the challenger); Harter v. Vernon, 953 F. Supp. 685, 689 (M.D.N.C. 1996)
(stating that a sheriff allegedly fired several deputies who had failed to support his
campaign actively), affd, 101 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 1996). Jenkins is simply another example
of the relative frequency of patronage discharges.
14. As discussed below, sheriffs have considerable leeway in making employment
decisions. See infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
15. The term "deputy sheriff" is used throughout this Comment to describe personnel
who are sworn law enforcement officers. This language is consistent with the Sheriff's
Education and Standards Commission definition. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 12, r.
10B.0103(14) (June 2000). Other personnel, such as detention officers, are not included in
the Jenkins rule. See Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544, 548 (2000) (en banc).
16. See infra notes 23-49 and 62-74 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 50-75 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 76-119 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 120-86 and accompanying text.
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safeguards from patronage practices it affords deputy sheriffs.2" Part
IV examines the North Carolina Constitution, pertinent appellate
decisions, relevant history, and the nature of deputies' jobs in order to
determine what standards should apply to patronage employment of
deputy sheriffs.2 Part IV proposes that, in light of the individualized
focus of the North Carolina Declaration of Rights,' deputies'
privilege against patronage practices should be examined on a caseby-case basis, rather than under a blanket rule.
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON PATRONAGE

A. Freedom of Belief and Association: The Raw PatronageDecisions
The United States Supreme Court has decided four political
patronage cases. Elrod v. Burns" first addressed the issue directly. In
Elrod, the newly elected Democratic sheriff terminated several
employees of the Sheriff's Office of Cook County, Illinois because
they were not Democrats, did not support the Democratic Party, and
were not sponsored by Democratic Party leaders.24 A plurality of the
Court concluded that patronage dismissals are unconstitutional under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution unless the dismissals are limited to employees in
"policymaking positions."'
Justice Stewart, in his concurrence,
concluded that political beliefs cannot be the sole ground upon which
to discharge a "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government
employee" who is performing his job satisfactorily.2 6 He limited his
concurrence to the facts in issue, and did not consider the broad
practice of patronage dismissals.2 7
In Branti v. Finkel,." the Court elaborated upon when an
employee's position is confidential or policymaking, but nevertheless
noted that occupying either of these types of positions is neither
20. See infra notes 133-86 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 187-326 and accompanying text.
22. N.C. CONsT. art. I. The Declaration of Rights resembles the federal Bill of Rights
and the subsequent amendments to the United States Constitution. It enumerates state
citizens' rights under the North Carolina Constitution.
23. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
24. Id at 351.
25. Id. at 372-373. The plurality was concerned with the restraints that patronage
practices placed on freedoms of political belief and association, which are part of the "core
of those activities protected by the First Amendment." I& at 356.
26. Id.at 375 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
27. 1i at 374 (Stewart, J., concurring).
28. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
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Branti

involved the termination of two assistant public defenders in

Rockland County, New York.30 The complaint alleged that the new
county public defender planned to discharge the assistants solely

31
because of their Republican political beliefs. The Court held that
governmental employers may not condition government employment
on political beliefs. 32 It reasoned that if employees cannot be
terminated because of their speech, their beliefs are protected as
well.33

29. Id. at 517-19. The Court illustrated this aspect of the holding with a few
hypothetical examples. The first example would arise in a state where the applicable law
required two election judges in a particular precinct to be registered in different parties.
Although such judges might not be policymakers or privy to confidential information, they
would nonetheless be subject to dismissal if they changed parties. According to the Court,
"party membership [would be] essential to the discharge of [these judges'] governmental
responsibilities." Id. The Court's second example involved a hypothetical head football
coach at a state university. The coach would certainly make team policy, but his politics
would be irrelevant to his job performance, and thus, an inappropriate basis for dismissal.
Indeed, the Court noted, "no one could seriously claim that Republicans make better
coaches than Democrats." Id In contrast, the Court explained that a state governor's
speechwriter could not perform his duties effectively if his beliefs were not synchronized
with the governor's. Id
30. Id at 508.
31. Id. Each plaintiff's job performance was satisfactory. Id at 510. Apparently, the
assistant public defenders' beliefs were determined by reference to their party registration
or lack thereof. Id at 509 nA. Although the Court spoke primarily of belief, one's
political ideology is essentially hidden from the cognizance of another without some
outward manifestation. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE
OF RIGHT 25 (W. Hastie, trans., 1887) (1785).

32. Branti, 445 U.S. at 515-16. This is a classic example of an unconstitutional
conditions case. Such cases illustrate the principle that although a person has no right to a
governmental benefit such as public employment, the government may not condition the
receipt of the benefit upon an unconstitutional condition. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 597-98 (1972). In other words, the government cannot infringe upon a constitutional
right directly, or indirectly. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). The modern
cases are not completely consistent with the application of this principle. Compare Fed.
Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 486 U.S. 364,395 (1984) (holding
that the government cannot condition funds on a requirement that public broadcasting
stations not editorialize), with Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S.
540, 550 (1983) (holding that the government may condition tax-exempt status on a
requirement that an organization refrain from lobbying). See generally Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1415, 1421-29 (1989)
(describing the components of an unconstitutional conditions case).
33. Branti, 445 U.S. at 515. The Court's rationale proves its deductive validity. The
major premise, that the First Amendment protects belief as well as speech, is unassailable.
See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457,471 (1997); Stanley v. Ga., 394
U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945); W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF
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Branti does not protect political belief absolutely, however.34
Once a plaintiff has proved that she was discharged because of failure
to affiliate with or to be sponsored by a particular party, 35 a
governmental employer may still prevail if it demonstrates a
compelling state interest,36 specifically, that in order for the employee
to perform effectively, her political beliefs must conform to the
government actor's beliefs.37 When an employee's beliefs interfere
with his duties, his employment may be terminated based solely on
his party affiliation.3
The Court extended the Elrod-Brantirule to several additional

types of patronage practices in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois.3 9

In Rutan, the Governor of Illinois exercised nearly absolute control
over decisions respecting state employment. 0 The Governor based

his employment decisions on whether potential employees voted in
Republican primaries, provided monetary or other support to
Republican candidates and the Party, agreed to join and work for the
Republican Party, and were supported by Republican officials.41 The
Court held that employment decisions related not only to discharge
but also to "promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring" based on party
support and affiliation are subject to the Elrod-Brantirule.42 Indeed,
SPEECH 47-50 (1989); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

6 (1970); Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 255; cf. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in JOHN STUART MILL, THREE ESSAYS 18
(Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1859) (asserting that "liberty of expressi[on] ... being almost
of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same
reasons, is practically inseparable from it"). The minor premise, that the First
Amendment protects government employee speech, is well established. See Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983); Mount
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,287 (1977); Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). The conclusion that the First Amendment protects
government employees' beliefs follows this progression.
34. Branti, 445 U.S. at 517.
35. Id. (explaining that plaintiffs state a prima facie case of unconstitutional state
action by showing that their political beliefs were the sole reason for their discharge).
36. This means a governmental interest, not a partisan interest. Id. at 517 n.12.
37. Id. at 515-16, 18. Whether the position is both the policymaking and confidential
type may be relevant, but it is no longer the basis for the inquiry. See infra note 29.
38. Branti, 445 U.S. at 517. Because public defenders bear responsibility for
representing indigent criminal defendants, party affiliation is not an appropriate
requirement for the position. Id. at 519.
39. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
40. Id. at 66.
41. Id42. Id. at 79. The Court was not concerned with whether the exception to ElrodBranti (that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the job) applied to the
particular plaintiffs because it conceded that it would not. Id. at 71 n.5. The types of
employment that the plaintiffs were either seeking or attempting to retain were a
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as the Court stated, "[tlo the victor belong only those spoils that may
be constitutionally obtained."4
Lastly, in O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake,4 the
City removed a tow truck company from its rotation list of available
towing contractors in retaliation for the owner's position in the
campaign to re-elect the mayor.45 O'Hare extended the protections
afforded governmental employees in the Elrod, Branti, and Rutan
decisions to government contractors as well. 46 In holding that neither

political association nor political patronage may form the basis for the
extension of public benefits such as government contracts, the Court

7 A
modified the scope of protection from political patronage
majority of the Court now recognizes that not only political belief, but
political association as well, can form the basis for impermissible
patronage practices.48 As long as either political belief or association
forms the sole basis for the patronage conduct in question, the Elrod-

Branti line of cases will apply, and the patronage may be

unconstitutional.
The significance of the O'Hare decision for North Carolina
deputy sheriffs is not that it extended increased protection from
political patronage to contractors, but that it recognized that in
certain cases the Elrod-Brantianalysis is not the sole inquiry. Rather,
rehabilitation counselor, a road equipment operator, a prison guard, a garage worker, and
a dietary manager. Id. at 67.
43. Id. at 64. This is an obvious allusion to New York Senator William Learned
Marcy's observation in 1832 that, "to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy." 8 REG.
DEB. 1,1325 (1832), availableat http:llmemory.loc.gov/ammemlamlawlhvrdlink.html.
44. 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
45. Id at 716. The City terminated the tow truck company's contract because the
owner refused to support the incumbent mayor's campaign, supported the mayor's
opponent in the election, and displayed the opponent's campaign posters at his business.
Id.at 715.
at 715.
46. ld.
47. Id.at 714-15.
48. Although the plurality in Elrod based its decision on freedom of belief and
association, see 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976), a majority of the Court agreed only that political
patronage interfered with freedom of belief. See 427 U.S. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Brant!v. Finkel limited its concerns to political belief. See 445 U.S. 507, 515 (1980). Rutan
relied on Brand's reasoning to extend the protection to all employment decisions. 497 U.S.
62, 79 (1990). O'Hare, on the other hand, relied on the Elrod plurality to reason that
"patronage does not justify the coercion of a person's political beliefs and associations."
518 U.S. at 718. In none of these cases did the Court reach the issue of association. None
of the plaintiffs in Rutan, Branti, or Elrod affirmatively supported another candidate.
Rutan, 497 U.S. at 66 (failure to support the Republican Party); Branti, 445 U.S. at 517
(failure to be affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic Party); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 350
(failure to be affiliated or sponsored by Democratic Party). In O'Hare, however, the
plaintiff did support the opposition. 518 U.S. at 715.
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the holding may require a balancing approach similar to the Court's
public employee free speech cases.49
B. Freedom of Speech: The PublicEmployee Speech Decisions
The Court noted in O'Hare that when a public employment
decision is based upon a political affiliation requirement "intermixed"
with an employee's expression, the Court's public employee free
speech decisions mandate a balancing test.50 This section briefly
examines the Supreme Court's public employee free speech
jurisprudence and the nature of the balancing test it requires.
Pickering v. Board of Education5 laid the foundation for public
employee free speech rights. In Pickering,a teacher sent a letter to a
newspaper, criticizing certain actions taken by the local Board of
Education 2 In retaliation for the letter, the board dismissed the
teacher from his employment.5 3 In holding that a teacher cannot be
dismissed from public employment for exercising his right to speak on
matters of public significance, 54 the Court recognized that in certain
circumstances the government could regulate its employees' speech
The
more heavily than the speech of the general public.55
is
protected
speech
a
public
employee's
of
whether
determination
entails a balancing approach. On one side of the scale is the public
employee's interest as a citizen in speaking on "matters of public
concern." 56 On the other side is the State's interest as an employer "in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees." 57 In Pickering,the balance favored the teacher. 8
In Connick v. Myers,59 the Court refined the inquiry into the
types of expression constituting speech on matters of public concern.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

518 U.S. at 719.
Id.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 564.
Id. at 564-65.
Id at 574.
Id. at 568.
Id See infra notes 60-62 (discussing matters of public concern).
Pickering,391 U.S. at 568.

58. See id. at 574. In determining how to strike the balance, the Court considered
several factors, including employee discipline and job performance, cohesiveness among
coworkers, the need for loyalty and confidence in close employment relationships, and the
statement's public or governmental impact. Id. at 569-73. The Court noted that the
teacher did not have a close working relationship with the Board of Education, so
personal loyalty and confidence were not implicated. Id. at 570. Further, the letter had no
negative impact on the teacher's performance in the classroom or with the functioning of
the school in general. Id. at 572-73.
59. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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'
The "content, form, and context of a given statement" determines
whether the expression refers to a matter of public concern. In

Connick, the

discharged

employee

circulated

a questionnaire

6
regarding the District Attorney's internal office policy. ' Although

one particular question touched on a matter of public concern, the

questionnaire as a whole did so only in a limited sense, so the District
62
Attorney was justified in dismissing the assistant who circulated it.
C. Speech and PatronageIntermixed
O'Hare recognized that in certain patronage cases, the freedom
of speech rights governed by the Pickering-Connickbalance, and the

freedom of political belief and association governed by the ElrodBranti line will be "intermixed."6 3 Such intermixed cases inevitably

will require the Pickering-Connickbalance. 64

O'Hareencompassed three intermixed facts. First, the petitioner

65
refused to contribute to the mayor's political campaign. This would
66
seem to fall under the raw political patronage line. Second, the
petitioner supported the opposing candidate. 67 Such support would

68
likely fall under the patronage line of cases as well. Finally, the

petitioner displayed the opponent's campaign posters at his
business.6 9 This activity is a form of expression that the Court has
protected as "speech.

' 70

Quite possibly, this scenario would implicate

60. Id. at 147-48.

61. Id at 148.
62. Id at 150. The Court emphasized the fact that the questionnaire was designed to
provide further fuel for the controversy. Id. at 148. Also, an assistant prosecutor's duties
at 151-52.
mandate close employee relationships. Id.
63. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712,719 (1996).
64. Id.The O'Hare Court did not state whether the case in question was such a
mixture or whether it should be governed by Elrod-Branti or by Pickering. The Court
only stated that either line of cases might govern the decision. Id.
65. Id at 715.

66. The "raw political patronage line" refers to Rutan, Branti, and Elrod, which dealt
solely with failure to support or failure to be affiliated with or sponsored by the political
party in question. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 66 (1990); Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,517 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,350 (1976).
67. O'Hare, 518 U.S. at 715. The nature of the petitioner's campaign support is
unclear, but it appears to have been monetary. See id. at 715. The facts state that the
mayor's "campaign committee asked [petitioner] for a contribution, which [he] refused to
make. [Petitioner] instead supported the campaign of the [mayor's] opponent." Id
68. The Court noted that the patronage cases "involved instances where the raw test
of political affiliation sufficed to show a constitutional violation." Id at 719. The mayor
likely was unhappy about the petitioner's affiliation with the opposite party, rather than
any expression he made on matters of public concern.
69. Id at715.
70. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 407 (1974) (ruling that hanging an
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the Pickering-Connickbalance. Political expression surely involves
matters of public concern, 71 which brings the Pickeringline into play,72

but the Court did not provide an answer. It remanded the case for
the lower court to decide which line of cases would apply.73 The
Court did not make clear whether the Elrod-Branti analysis (belief
and association) and the Pickering-Connickbalance (expression) are
mutually exclusive, or whether they could be applied conjunctively,74
but it indicated that the Elrod-Branti line should afford more
protection to ideology than that afforded to political speech. 75
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON DEPUTY SHERIFFS AND PATRONAGE

The Supreme Court's patronage and public employee free
speech jurisprudence has created considerable disagreement in the
United States Courts of Appeals when applied to the employment of
deputy sheriffs. Courts of appeals apply the Elrod-Branti inquiry in
nearly all cases, even those resembling free speech discharges rather
than raw patronage discharges.76 Yet, the Court of Appeals for the
Amercian flag with a peace symbol was protected speech). By placing a campaign poster
on private property the owner means to send the message that that people should vote for
the particular candidate. Id. at 410-11; cf.Eu v. S. F. County Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) ("The First Amendment has its 'fullest and most urgent
application' to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.") (quoting Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,272 (1971)).
71. Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 885 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that involvement
in a political candidate's campaign "relate[s] to a matter of public concern"). One of the
First Amendment's key purposes is to "protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs." Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218-19 (1966).
72. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
73. O'Hare,518 U.S. at 726.
74. The Court stated "that the inquiry [in raw patronage cases] is whether the
affiliation requirement is a reasonable one." Id. at 719. More specifically, "[a]
reasonableness analysis will also accommodate those many cases ... where specific
instances of the employee's speech or expression, which require balancing in the Pickering
context, are intermixed with a political affiliation requirement. In those cases, the
balancing Pickeringmandates will be inevitable." Id. This appears to allow for an analysis
along both lines of cases. But the Court's opinion ended with a remand to decide whether
to apply the Pickering-Connickbalance or the Elrod-Branti rule. Id. at 726. Thus, the
analysis apparently relies on either of the two rules, but not both.
75. Id. at 719 (noting that "one's beliefs and allegiances ought not to be subject to
probing and testing by the government").
76. See Diruzza v. County of Tehama, 206 F.3d 1304, 1307, 1309 (9th Cir. 2000) cert.
denied, 121 S.Ct. 624 (2000) (applying Elrod-Brantito a deputy who publicly supported an
opposing candidate and noting that a categorical rule deeming all deputies "policymakers"
is inconsistent with the Elrod-Branti analysis); Hall v. Tollet, 128 F.3d 418, 424 (6th Cir.
1997) (applying Elrod-Branti to a candidate who supported the challenger vocally);
Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1160, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (applying ElrodBrantito deputies who supported opposing candidates and noting that there is "no clearer
way for a deputy to demonstrate opposition to a candidate... than to actively campaign
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Fifth Circuit generally applies the Pickering-Connick balance.'
Adding to the confusion, the Circuits applying the Elrod-Brantirule
disagree as to whether party affiliation is a reasonably appropriate
requirement for employment as a deputy sheriff.78 This conflict may
result from disagreement about the proper scope of the Elrod-Branti
rule, variance in the nature of deputies' jobs in different localities, or
some combination of these factors. The cases discussed below
demonstrate the different approaches several courts of appeals take

in assessing patronage claims, as well as the various forms of
patronage practices present in sheriffs'

offices throughout the

country.
A. Circuits InvalidatingPatronagePracticesin the Employment of
Deputies
Some circuits welcome deputies' patronage claims. The Third
Circuit, in a case in which deputies were dismissed for supporting
other candidates rather than the incumbent, held that party affiliation
was an inappropriate requirement for the employment of the deputies
in question. 79 After examining the duties of deputy sheriffs in the
particular county, the court determined that the deputies' limited
tasks were not relevant to party affiliation. 80
for the candidate's opponent"); Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1022 (3d Cir.
1992) (applying Elrod-Brantito deputies who supported opposing candidates); Upton v.
Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1210 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Elrod-Branti to a deputy who
displayed a bumper sticker in support of the opposing candidate); Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d
373, 374, 377 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Elrod-Branti to deputy sheriffs who opposed the
new sheriff's election). Some of these cases were decided prior to O'Hare so to that
extent, the application of Elrod-Branti could be replaced with the Pickering-Connick
balance.
77. See Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691, 703 (5th Cir. 1998); McBee v. Jim
Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009, 1014 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
78. Compare Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1164 (holding that North Carolina deputies can be
dismissed on patronage grounds), Upton, 930 F.2d at 1218 (holding that Illinois sheriffs
may use political considerations when hiring and firing deputies), and Terry, 866 F.2d at
377 (holding that Alabama deputies' political loyalty to the sheriff is an appropriate job
requirement), with Diruzza, 206 F.3d at 1311 (holding that summary judgment was
improper where scant evidence supported the conclusion that the California deputy was a
policymaker subject to patronage discharge); Hall, 128 F.3d at 429 (holding that the
defendant failed to show that political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement for a
deputy in a particular Tennessee county); and Burns, 971 F.2d at 1022-23 (holding that
party affiliation does not further the effective performance of the tasks required by
deputies in a particular Pennsylvania county).
79. Burns, 971 F.2d at 1017, 1022-23.
80. Id at 1022. The deputies in Cambria County served process, transported
prisoners, and provided courtroom security. Idaat 1022-23. Apparently, they exercised
no law enforcement powers. The Court mentioned the Pickering-Connickline of cases,
but did not apply it. Id. at 1021 n.5.
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In Hall v. Tollett,81 a Tennessee sheriff fired a deputy because he
"hauled around the wrong bumper sticker. '82 The Sixth Circuit
applied Elrod and Branti,83 and held that a front-line deputy whose
duty was to enforce state law throughout the county could not be
dismissed because of his political affiliation.84 Notably, the Court
analyzed the duties of this particular Cumberland County deputy
sheriff, rather than all Tennessee deputy sheriffs. 8
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected the assertion that
California deputies, by virtue of their position, categorically were
subject to patronage discharge. 86 The deputy in that case publicly
supported the candidate opposing the incumbent sheriff.' Relying on
Elrod, Branti, Rutan, and O'Hare, the court remanded the case to the
district court but noted that the record did not seem to support the
conclusion that the deputy was a policymaker. 88
B. The Fifth Circuit'sSpectrum of Patronageand Free Speech
In the Fifth Circuit, raw patronage cases, free speech cases, and
intermixed cases are analyzed along a spectrum.89 Raw patronage

cases, 90 analyzed according to the Elrod-Brantirule, are on one end.91
Pure free speech cases fall at the other end, and are analyzed

81. 128 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 1997).
82. Id. at 427. Seemingly, the sticker supported the sheriff's opponent. See id.The
court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for proof of the sheriff's
motivation. See id. at 430.
83. Id. at 427-29. The opinion omitted Connick and Pickering. See id.
84. Id. at 429. A chief deputy in the same case was not so fortunate. Political
affiliation was relevant to his position because it entailed a significant level of
policymaking authority and discretion. Id. at 425-26.
85. See id.at 429. The Court did not foreclose the possibility that other deputies,
perhaps in other counties or with more responsibilities than the plaintiff deputy, could be
properly subject to patronage discharge. See id.
86. See Diruzza v. County of Tehama, 206 F.3d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
121 S.Ct. 624 (2000).
87. Id. at 1307. The deputy even appeared in a television commercial in support of
the opposing candidate's campaign. Id.
88. Id. at 1311. Most of the deputy's duties related to the custody of inmates in the
county jail. Id.
89. Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691, 704 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting McBee v.
Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009, 1014 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane)).
90. For a discussion of the raw patronage cases, see supra notes 23-49 and
accompanying text.
91. Brady, 145 F.3d at 704-05. There is little room for a Pickering-Connickbalance,
because in raw political patronage cases the employees do "not campaign, they [do] not
even speak: they merely [think]." McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.3d 1009, 1014 (5th
Cir. 1984).
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according to the Pickering-Connick balance.' In intermixed cases,
those involving both political affiliation and free speech, the Fifth
Circuit applies the Pickering-Connickbalancing test.93
For example, in Brady v. Fort Bend County, the incumbent
sheriff discharged several deputies who supported the other candidate
"by attending rallies, posting signs, and campaigning door-to-door." 94
Applying the Pickering-Connick balance, the court of appeals first
concluded that the deputies' support of the campaign for sheriff
related to a matter of public concern. 9 The court then weighed the
respective rights of the deputies and the sheriff, concluding that the
balance weighed in favor of the deputies.9 6
C. CircuitsBarringPatronageClaimsBy Deputies
In Terry v. Cook, 7 a newly elected sheriff in Alabama fulfilled
his campaign promise to replace the former sheriff's employees, and
appoint individuals who had supported his campaign.98 The Eleventh
Circuit applied the Elrod-Branti rule as opposed to the PickeringConnick balance to this blanket dismissal of employees. 99 After
discussing the role of deputy sheriffs under Alabama law,"° the court
held that for these deputies, effective job performance required
allegiance to the sheriff's policies and goals. 01 Thus, the sheriff was
justified in dismissing them. 102

92. See Brady, 145 F.3d at 704-05. Pure free speech cases do not implicate a person's
political beliefs necessarily. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 859 (5th Cir.
1970) (holding that when the employee's exercise of his constitutional privileges clearly
outweighed his value as an employee, the government could dismiss him).
93. See Brady, 145 F.3d at 705; McBee, 730 F.2d at 1014. The Fifth Circuit noted that
the Supreme Court approved of its formulation in O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 518 U.S. 712,719 (1996). Brady, 145 F.3d at 705.
697.
94. 145 F.3d at
95. Id at 707. Fifth Circuit precedent recognizes campaign activity as unquestionably
relating to matters of public concern. See Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 885 (5th Cir.
1995).
96. Brady, 145 F.3d at 710.
97. 866 F.2d 373 (11th Cir. 1989).
98. lId at 374.
99. Id.at 377. The Eleventh Circuit devoted several pages of its opinion to
at 375-77.
determining whether Pickering-Connickor Elrod-Brantiwould apply. See id.
100. The court explained that deputies are agents or alter egos of the sheriff and can
bind the sheriff civilly for all actions within the scope of their duties. Id at 377.
101. Id. at 377. The remaining employees (clerks, investigators, dispatchers, jailers,
and process servers) were not subject to the exception, and the court reversed summary
judgment for their claims. Id. at 378.
102. Id. at 377.
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Although Terry dealt with raw political patronage, 103 a year later
the Seventh Circuit decided Upton v. Thompson,'04 a case that
implicates some aspects of freedom of speech. Two newly elected
sheriffs in Illinois dismissed their predecessors' deputies for having
supported their opponents. 10 5 One deputy displayed a bumper sticker
in favor of the incumbent candidate and headed an organization that
endorsed him.' The other deputy put up signs, attended fundraising
events, and vocally supported the incumbent sheriff.)° In deciding
the case, the court ignored the Pickering-Connickbalance. It held
that under the Elrod-Branti rule, Illinois deputies are subject to
patronage dismissals because they implement the policies of the
sheriff, who owes his political survival to their performance. 0
As the approaches described above demonstrate, courts have
created various mechanisms for evaluating the variety of patronage
claims they confront. With respect to the rights of deputies in North
Carolina, however, Jenkins v. Medford represents the most salient
decision. 09
According to the briefly stated facts, the deputies claimed they
were dismissed for not supporting Medford's election, supporting his
opponents, and not associating politically with his campaign.10
Pursuant to an Elrod, Brand, and Rutan analysis, the court held that
prevailing sheriffs in an election may dismiss deputies because of their
campaign activity or party affiliation."' This holding applies to North
Carolina deputies and 2 sheriffs universally, not just to those in the
county in controversy. 1

103. Cf Rutan v. Republican Party of I1., 427 U.S. 62, 65 (1990) (discussing politically
based discharges of several employees); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980)
(describing discharges that did not depend on any affirmative expression).
104. 930 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1991).
105. Id. at 1210-11.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1211. The deputy also happened to be the incumbent sheriff's brother. I.
108. Id. at 1213-15. The Court made no distinction between the two deputies, one of
whom was a chief deputy (second in command to the former sheriff) for thirteen years. Id.
at 1210-11. The other was a probationary deputy with only three months on the job. Id.
109. 119 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). See also supra notes 1-14 (discussing
Jenkins' facts and impact on North Carolina deputy sheriffs).
110. Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1158.
111. Id. at 1164. The court only mentioned Pickering and Connick in passing. See id.
at 1162 n.20 (noting that "[w]hen public employees are subjected to discipline for the
content of their speech, courts analyze those claims under the Connick-Pickering line of
cases").
112. Id. at 1164.
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Judge Motz criticized the majority's opinion on two grounds.
First, the majority completely ignored the deputies' free speech claim
under Pickering and Connick."4 Second, the majority's holding was
too sweeping, in Judge Motz's view. Rather than making a wholesale
pronouncement on the status of all North Carolina deputies, the
majority should have examined the duties of the particular deputies in
question." 5
Although it represents the law in federal courts within the Fourth
Circuit, Jenkins does not signal the reemergence of patronage in
North Carolina sheriffs' offices. The case merely compels the inquiry
into state law protection.
Because the North Carolina State
Constitution seems to demand a more particularized inquiry, the
blanket rule that Jenkins mandated under the federal Constitution
appears inappropriate at the state level. Rather, the state constitution
would require an individual analysis similar to the kind Judge Motz
advocated in Jenkins."6 Several factors support this difference. Most
significantly, the North Carolina Supreme Court has stressed the
personal nature of the state constitution's freedom of speech
provision. 117 Also, North Carolina common and statutory law may
afford more protection to deputies than the Jenkins rule."' Because
constitutional claims are available to deputies only if no statutory or
common law remedies exist," 9 the analysis of deputies' rights in
North Carolina begins with common and statutory law.

113. Id at 1168-69 (Motz, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
Judge Motz pointed out that the deputies
"[u]nquestionably" stated a claim under Pickering and Connick. Indeed, in the majority's
own words: "[w]e can think of no clearer way for a deputy to demonstrate opposition to a
candidate for sheriff.., than to actively campaign for the candidate's opponent." I& at
1164-65. Although the discharges could have been permissible under Pickering and
Connick, Judge Motz argued that they should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Id. at 1170-71 (Motz, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1169 (Motz, J., dissenting). Although Judge Motz conceded that discharging
some North Carolina deputies for patronage reasons may be proper, she explained that to
hold that every one of the state's more than 4,500 deputies is a policymaking employee
allows the narrowly drawn exception to swallow the rule. Id. at 1170-71.
116. Id. at 1168-69 (Motz, J., dissenting).
117. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761,781,413 S.E.2d 276,289 (1992).
118. See infra notes 120-86.
119. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289; Lorbacher v. Hous. Auth., 127 N.C.
663, 675, 493 S.E.2d 74, 81 (1989).
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III. RELEVANT NORTH CAROLINA COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY
LAW

A. The At-Will Employment Doctrine and the Public Policy Exception
Under North Carolina common law, employment for an
indefinite period of time is terminable at will by either party.120 In
addition, the North Carolina General Statutes specifically declare
that North Carolina deputies are at-will employees . 2' Deputies
literally "serve at the pleasure of the Sheriff."'

Under this statute

and the common law, a sheriff may discharge a deputy for almost any
reason, even an arbitrary or irrational reason, or for no reason at
all. 23 No one, including the county commissioners, may interfere
with a sheriff's decision to terminate a deputy's employment. 24
Because a sheriff's discretion is nearly unfettered, deputies enjoy little
job protection compared to civil service126employees,' 25 or employees
working under an employment contract.
An important exception to North Carolina's at-will employment
doctrine is that an at-will employee may not be discharged for a
reason contravening public policy. 127 If such a termination occurs, the
employee may recover in a civil action for wrongful discharge. 128 The
120. Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc. 347 N.C. 329,331,493 S.E.2d 420,422
(1997); Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1990);
Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254,259, 182 S.E.2d 403,406 (1971).
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-103(2) (1999).
122. Id
123. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 422; Burgess, 326 N.C. at 209, 388
S.E.2d at 137; Still, 279 N.C. at 259, 182 S.E.2d at 406. There are limits, of course. The
public policy exception, the North Carolina Constitution, and the United States
Constitution in conjunction with federal statutes, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. V
1999), all place limits on a sheriff's exercise of employment decisions. See also infra notes
127-32 (discussing the public policy exception); infia notes 187-291 (discussing the state
constitution).
124. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-103(1) (1999) (providing the sheriff with the
"exclusive right" to make employment decisions).
125. Civil service employees, such as state personnel, can be terminated only for cause.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-35 (1999).
126. See Mortenson v. Magneti Marelli U.S.A., Inc., 122 N.C. App. 486, 488-89, 470
S.E.2d 354, 356 (1996).
127. See Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 175, 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1989)
(quoting Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331,342,328 S.E.2d 818, 826 (1985) overruled
on othergrounds by Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333, 493 S.E.2d at 423)). Prior to Sides, North
Carolina courts did not review employment termination decisions. Cf. Dockery v.
Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 298, 244 S.E.2d 272, 276 (1978) (holding that absent
a statutory remedy, an at-will employee cannot recover in tort for an alleged wrongful
termination).
128. See Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 343,328 S.E.2d at 826.
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public policy exception relies on the premise that no one should be
permitted to act in a way that injures the public.129 An example of a
public policy violation occurs when an employee's termination
contravenes a stated statutory policy.130 The mere fact that an
employer has violated public policy will not give rise to a claim of
wrongful termination, however. 131 The discharged employee carries
of showing the employer's actual intent to violate the
the burden
132
policy
B. Section 153A-99 of the North CarolinaGeneralStatutes: Protection
from PatronagePractices
If terminating a deputy sheriff for patronage reasons contravenes
the public policy of North Carolina, the public policy exception to the
at-will employment rule will preclude sheriffs from doing so.
Similarly, if a statute speaks to the patronage issue, a deputy would be
required to seek a remedy under the statute, making constitutional
interpretation unnecessary.1 33 At first glance, section 153A-99 of the
North Carolina General Statutes appears to confront the question
directly, 134 and persuasive authority supports the proposition that the
36 But
statute applies to elected county officials, 35 including sheriffs.
129. Coman, 325 N.C. at 175 n.2, 381 S.E.2d at 447 n.2 (citing Petermann v. Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)). The Appellate Division has not
provided a clear explanation of the exception. The supreme court noted that any
refinement of the definition of public policy would engender greater confusion. Amos v.
Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C. 348,353 n.1, 416 S.E.2d 166,169 n.1 (1992).
130. Amos, 331 N.C. at 353,416 S.E.2d at 169.
131. See Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors, Inc., 350 N.C. 567, 572, 515 S.E.2d 438,
441 (1999).
132. Id In Garner,for example, the defendant employer required an employee to take
a drug test that was not administered by a state-approved laboratory, which was a
violation of public policy. Id. But firing the employee because of his failure to take the
test did not violate public policy. Id.
133. This is not to say that a plaintiff should rely solely on the statutory provision and
ignore a potential constitutional argument. The best course is to argue alternatively. See,
e.g., Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 24, Harter v. Vernon, 139 N.C. App. 85, 532 S.E.2d
836 (2000) (arguing in the alternative that the state constitution applied if the statute did
not), appeal dismissed, 353 N.C. 263, 546 S.E.2d 97 (2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1962
(2001).
134. The statute, entitled "County employee political activity," includes in its purpose
the prevention of "political or partisan coercion." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-99(a) (1999).
See also Vereen v. Holden, 121 N.C. App. 779, 784, 468 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1996) (holding
that if a county employee proved she was dismissed due to her political affiliation the
discharge would contravene the public policy in section 153A-99).
135. See Definition of City and County Employee as Including Elected Officials;
Political Activities of Local Gov't Elected Officials and Employees, Op. Att'y Gen.
(1998), 1998 WL 121653, at *2 [hereinafter Attorney General Opinion]. Advisory
opinions written by attorneys general are not binding authority, but are respectfully
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as discussed below, the statute's gaps potentially allow certain forms
37
of patronage to fall through.1
The statute begins with a statement of purpose, 138 and contains
provisions seeking to carry out that purpose.139 Subsection (d)
prohibits persons from requiring their employees to contribute funds
for political or partisan purposes as a condition of employment.140
The implication is obvious here: A county employee cannot be
discharged for failing to give monetary support to the sheriff's
campaign. 141 Nevertheless, this inference applies to deputy sheriffs if,
and only if, deputy sheriffs are "[c]ounty employees' 1 42 within the
meaning of the statute.
Under section 153A-99 a "[c]ounty employee" is "any person
employed by a county or any department or program thereof that is
supported, in whole or in part, by county funds." 143 Using this
definition, subsection (d) would not apply to persons seeking
employment in a sheriff's office, as for example, in Rutan, 44 because
such persons are not yet "employed" within the meaning of the
statute. Subsection (d) appears inapplicable to initial employment

considered. Hannah v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 176 N.C. 395, 396, 97 S.E. 160, 161 (1918);
Williams v. Alexander County Bd. of Educ., 128 N.C. App. 599, 602, 495 S.E.2d 406, 408
(1998).
136. See Carter v. Good, 951 F. Supp. 1235, 1248-49 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (rejecting the
argument that sheriffs are not county employees within the meaning of § 153A-99), rev'd
per curiam, Carter v. Good, No. 96-1965, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10120, at *12 (4th Cir.
May 19, 1998) (providing full opinion dismissing federal claims on summary judgment and
state claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). United States courts' interpretations
of North Carolina law are afforded weight similar to state attorneys general's opinions.
They are persuasive, but not binding. Cf. Johnson v. Tr. of Durham Technical Cmty.
Coll., 139 N.C. App. 676, 682, 535 S.E.2d 357, 362 (2000) (citing federal authority
supporting the position that failure to renew an employment contract may be actionable).
137. See infra notes 134-86 and accompanying text.
138. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-99(a) (1999). The purposes include ensuring that
employees are not politically coerced while on the job and that their off-the-job political
associations are not hindered. Id.
139. § 153A-99(c)-(f).
140. § 153A-99(d).
141. Compulsory campaign support is a common patronage practice. See, e.g., Harter
v. Vernon, 953 F. Supp. 685, 689 (M.D.N.C. 1996) ("[O]fficers were told 'Remember who
you're working for.' "), affd, 101 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 1996).
142. § 153A-99 (b)(1).
143. Id. The definition in this section is absolutely controlling, whether or not it
comports with the common understanding of the term "county employee." See State v.
Lucas, 302 N.C. 342,346,275 S.E.2d 433,436 (1981); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 309 (1999).
144. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990) (holding that the
constitutional prohibition on patronage practices extends to hirings).
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decisions. 145 Furthermore, a reasonable argument exists that it does
not apply to deputy sheriffs at all.
The definition's first prong, which encompasses "any person
employed by a county," does not apply to deputy sheriffs.146 In fact,
North Carolina law specifically rejects the proposition that counties
are not liable149for negligent
employ deputies. 47 For example, counties
48
acts or omissions of on-duty deputies,1 yet sheriffs are.
The second prong' 5° applies to "any person employed by a
county or any department or program thereof that is supported, in
whole or in part, by county funds."'151 Inclusion of the term "thereof"
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-99(d) (stating that "[n]o employee may be required as a
duty or condition of employment, promotion, or tenure to office to contribute funds for
political or partisan purposes.") One could argue that "condition of employment" refers
to all employment decisions, including hiring, but this would not be ejusdem generis with
the terms "promotion" and "tenure," which relate to decisions regarding employment that
has already commenced. See, e.g., Nance v. S. Ry. Co., 149 N.C. 366, 371, 63 S.E. 116, 118
(1908) (noting that "when words of general import are used, and immediately following
and relating to the same subject, words of a particular or restricted import are found, the
latter shall operate to limit and restrict the former"). But see N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v.
Century Indem. Co., 115 N.C. App. 175, 191, 444 S.E.2d 464, 473-74 (1994) (noting that
the cannon of ejusdem generis applies where general words follow specific words).
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-99(b)(1) (1999).
147. Clark v. Burke County, 117 N.C. App. 85, 89, 450 S.E.2d 747,749 (1994) (holding
that a "deputy is an employee of the sheriff, not the county"); see Hubbard v. County of
Cumberland, 143 N.C. App. 149, 152, 544 S.E.2d 587, 589 (2001) (noting that "it is the
Sheriff, and not the County, who directly hires law enforcement officers, [and therefore
deputies] do not enjoy all of the protections of County employees"); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 153A-103(1) (1999) (granting sheriffs the "exclusive right" to employ or discharge
deputies). But cf.Borders v. Cline, 212 N.C. 472, 477, 193 S.E. 826, 830 (1937) (holding
that a deputy is not an employee of the sheriff under the workers' compensation statute).
Borders does nothing to support the proposition that a deputy sheriff is employed by a
county, and relates only to how the term "employment" is defined in the workers'
compensation statute. Id.at 475, 193 S.E. at 828. The case generally points to an even
closer relationship than employer/employee between sheriffs and deputies. See id. at 476,
193 S.E. at 829.
148. Clark, 117 N.C. App. at 89, 450 S.E.2d at 749 (holding that the county cannot be
held liable for the deputy's allegedly negligent high speed chase). Normally the doctrine
of respondeat superior allows plaintiffs to seek damages from employers that cause them
personal injury in the course of working, provided that the plaintiffs establish an
employer/employee relationship. Stanley v. Brooks, 112 N.C. App. 609, 613, 436 S.E.2d
272, 274 (1993). See generally 19 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 4TH, Labor and
Employment § 223 (4th ed. 1992 & Supp. 2000) (explaining North Carolina's respondeat
superior doctrine). North Carolina law, however, bars a plaintiff who seeks to implead a
county in a civil action for damages caused by a deputy. Clark, 117 N.C. App. at 89, 450
S.E.2d at 749. A plaintiff can implead a sheriff and his surety. Id
149. Clark, 117 N.C. App. at 89,450 S.E.2d at 749.
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-99(b). The quotation includes the definition's first
prong, but both are included to illustrate that the term "thereof" refers to the term
"county."
151. Id (emphasis added).
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renders the definition's second prong ambiguous. Deputies are, of
course, employees of the sheriff's department or sheriff's office, 52 and
all sheriff's offices or departments are supported in part by county
funds." 3 This logical progression, however, does not decide the issue.
Whether a sheriff's department would be considered a department of
the county 54 for purposes of the statute remains open to debate.
Reasonable arguments support both conclusions, depending on which
formulation of the term of is used, and how formalistically one
chooses to construe the statute.
Using the term of "as a function word to indicate a quality or
possession characterizing or distinguishing a subject," 15 5 it appears the
definitional section does not apply to deputy sheriffs. Wherever the
North Carolina General Statutes reference law enforcement agencies,
they include "sheriff's department" in the possessive form on the
list. 5 6 This language implies that the "sheriff's department" is a
department of the sheriff not a department of the county. Further, a
chapter dealing with the "North Carolina Sheriffs' Education and
Training Standards Commission" defines the department or office as:
"the sheriff of a county, his deputies, his employees," and the physical
facilities they use. 7
Use of the possessive pronoun further

152. Sheriffs in North Carolina title their administrations as either "Sheriff's Office" or
"Sheriff's Department."
See, e.g., Burke County Sheriff's Office, at http://
www.burkesheriff.org (last visited Aug. 25, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Catawba County Sheriff's Department, at http://www.co.catawba.nc.us/depts
sherifflshrfmain.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). The General Statutes also use the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 14-313 (1999) (sheriff's department), 66-164(2) (sheriff's office), 17E-2 (defining
"office" and "department" identically). Use of either term should not affect the statute's
construction. Otherwise, a sheriff could avoid the statute through a simple name change.
153. See MAPS GROUP, INST. OF GOv'T, COUNTY SALARIES IN NORTH CAROLINA
36-47 (2000).
154. The formulation of the county derives from the definition in subsection (b)(1).
The definition refers to "a county or any department or program thereof .... ." § 153A99(b)(1) (1999). "Therof" is defined as "of it."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 2372 (3d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S]. If one conceives of "it" as the county, the term becomes: any
department orprogram of the county.
155. WEBSTER'S, supra note 154, at 1565.
156. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-399(i)(3); Id § 17E-7(b); Id. § 18B-501(f); Id.§ 58-32-1;
Id.§ 90-95.2(b)(2); Id.§ 114-18.1(b)(3); Id. § 132-1.4(a)(3); Id. § 143B-216.34; Id. § 160A288(b)(2); Id.§ 160A-288.2(b)(2). Each of these statutes uses the possessive form, that is
to say, with an apostrophe between the "f" and "s" of the word "sheriff's."
157. N.C. GEN STAT. § 17E-2(2) (1999) (emphasis added). Although the definitions
contained in this section only apply to chapter 17E, definitions in one statute are
illustrative in construing the terms of another if they are related in subject. 82 CJ.S.
Statutes § 309 (1999).
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demonstrates that the General Assembly considers the sheriff's
department a department of the sheriff, not the county.'

Alternatively, the statute might support the assertion that the
sheriffs department comes under the county's umbrella. Because the
term of also means "relating to,"'159 a deputy sheriff may fall within
the definition of "[c]ounty employee."'" The sheriff is the county's
The county also makes
chief law enforcement officer. 61

appropriations to the sheriffs department. 162 The conclusion here is

that the sheriff's department clearly "relates to" the county, and is
163
Furthermore, the
thus "a department or program thereof."'

formulations may not be exclusive per se; the sheriff s office may be a
department of the sheriff and of the county. In either case, deputy
64 Thus, they
sheriffs are employees of the sheriff's department.)

should be considered "[c]ounty
protected from being required

employees,"' 65

and therefore

to contribute to the sheriffs

Additionally, to avoid the issue of patronage under the
state constitution, courts may construe subsection (d) to cover deputy
sheriffs. 167 Thus, statutory construction more likely supports the
campaign.' 66

contribute to sheriffs'
assertion that
6 deputies cannot be forced to

campaigns.) 8

Subsection (c) offers county employees additional protection.
This subsection prohibits "employee[s]" from using their "official
authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting
16 9
the result of an election or nomination to political office."'

Employees may not "[c]oerce, solicit, or compel contributions for
70
Once again,
political or partisan purposes" from other employees.

158. Cf.Williams v. Williams, 113 N.C. App. 226, 229, 437 S.E.2d 884, 887 (1994)
(noting that courts should construe statutes relating to the same subject with reference to
one another).
159. WEBSTER'S, supra note 154, at 1565.
160. § 153A-99(b)(1).
161. S. Ry. Co. v. Mecklenburg County, 231 N.C. 148,151,56 S.E.2d 438,440 (1949).
162. See INST. OF GOV'T, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 384, 496
(David M. Lawrence & Warren J. Wicker eds., 1982).
163. § 153A-99(b)(1).
164. Cf.Clark v. Burke County, 117 N.C. App. 85, 89, 450 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1994)
(finding that "[a] deputy is an employee of the sheriff").
165. § 153A-99(b)(1).
166. § 153A-99(d).
167. Cf.William R. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three Branch
Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 836-43 (2001) (describing the constitutional
avoidance phenomenon at the federal court level).
168. § 153A-99(c).
169. § 153A-99(c)(1).
170. § 153A-99(c)(2). As if subsection (d) were not confusing enough, subsection
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the applicability of the subsection depends on who is an "employee."
This time, the crucial question is whether the sheriff is an employee

within the meaning of the definitional subsection. Although available
authority suggests that sheriffs are employees within the meaning of
the statute, 171 the ambiguities that remain prevent a firm conclusion.

Once again, a "person employed by a county" is considered a
"[c]ounty employee" or "employee" within the meaning of the
statute.172 Whether the sheriff is such a person might be governed by
the common law test, 73 which focuses on the party that has control

over the worker.174 Factors such as the power to assign hours and
duties, and to control how those duties are discharged impact the

existence of control

75

The counties maintain no such control over

the sheriffs, who use their own judgment to discharge their duties. 176
Further, the election process renders the sheriff accountable to the
county's citizens, rather than the county itself.177 Thus, the common

law employer-employee relationship does not seem to exist between
the sheriff and the county, and subsection (c) would not restrict
sheriffs' behavior.
Additionally, the common law of contracts supports the assertion

that counties do not employ sheriffs. Employment is essentially
contractual and is governed by contract law. 78 Although sheriffs
(c)(2) requires analysis of whether two different persons are "employee[s]." See id.
171. See Carter v. Good, 951 F. Supp. 1235, 1248-49 (W.D.N.C 1996) (rejecting the
argument that sheriffs are not county employees within the meaning of § 153A-99), rev'd
per curiam, Carter v. Good, No. 96-1965, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10120, at *12 (4th Cir.
May 19, 1998) (per curiam) (providing full opinion dismissing federal claims on summary
judgment and state claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Cf Attorney General
Opinion, supra note 135, at *1, 2 (concluding that § 153A-99 applies to elected county
officials).
172. § 153A-99(b)(1). The drafters likely included this cautious tautology to ensure
that the most common meaning of the word "employee" was not excluded. See Hollowell
v. N.C. Dept. of Conservation and Devel., 206 N.C. 206, 208-09, 173 S.E.2d 603, 604
(1934).
173. Cf Sutton v. Ward, 92 N.C. App. 215, 217, 374 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1988) (noting that
the common law test governs the existence of the employer-employee relationship under
the Workers' Compensation Act).
174. Id.; Barrington v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 55 N.C. App. 638, 642, 286 S.E.2d
576, 579 (1982).
175. See Sutton, 92 N.C. App. at 217, 374 S.E.2d at 279; Barrington,55 N.C. App. at
642, 286 S.E.2d at 579.
176. Cf. Borders v. Cline, 212 N.C. 476, 472, 193 S.E. 826, 828-29 (1937) (noting that
the sheriff's office is subject to the power of the General Assembly, and requires public
confidence).
177. N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (prescribing the method for electing sheriffs).
178. Alliance Co. v. State Hosp., 241 N.C. 329, 332, 85 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1955) ("The
relation of employer and employee is essentially contractual in its nature, and is to be
determined by the rules governing the establishment of contracts, express or implied.").
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occupy each county's chief law enforcement post,179 they are
Sheriffs'
independent, constitutionally elected officials. 80
employment arises not out of a contract between themselves and the
counties they serve, but by virtue of an election. 181 As a result of this

lack of contractual status, sheriffs may not be county "employees" for
purposes of subsection (c).
Nevertheless, the argument that sheriffs are not contracted

employees was rejected in a different context. In Durham Herald Co.
v. County of Durham,' 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
an applicant for the office of sheriff was covered by the county
personnel records statute'83 because he was an "applicant for
employment" within the meaning of the statute. 184 The court stated

that the fact that a sheriff is an officer rather than an employee was
15
not material to the case, although it might be significant to others.

The distinction may be material in the context of section 153A-99,
however, making it likely that most sheriffs would fall outside
subsection (c)'s coverage.' 86

IV. THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION: PROTECTION OF
POLITICAL RIGHTS

Although section 153A-99, in conjunction with the public policy
exception to the at-will employment doctrine, might marginally
safeguard deputies from political patronage practices,'17 the inquiry is
not over. North Carolina employees may not be discharged in
contravention of the rights protected by the state constitution.118
These protections are enumerated in the Declaration of Rights, 8 9
179. S. Ry. Co. v. Mecklenburg County, 231 N.C. 148,151,56 S.E.2d 438,440 (1949).
180. N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 2; Borders,212 N.C. at 476, 193 S.E. at 828-29 (stating that
a sheriff "takes office, not by contract, but by commission").
181. See Borders,212 N.C. at 476,193 S.E. at 828-29.
182. 334 N.C. 677,435 S.E.2d 317 (1993).
183. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-98 (1999).
184. 334 N.C. at 679, 435 S.E.2d at 319.
185. Id. The court failed to explain when the distinction would be material. Id.
186. Clearly, section 153A-99 does not apply to newly elected sheriffs until they qualify
for the office. The outgoing sheriff retains office until the successor becomes qualified.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-7 (1999). The newly elected sheriff must take two oaths as a
condition of qualification. §§ 11-7, 11-11. A newly elected sheriff who does not take the
oaths cannot serve. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-5.
187. See supra notes 120-86 and accompanying text.
188. See Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290-91 (1992);
Lorbacher v. Hous. Auth., 127 N.C. App. 663, 675, 493 S.E.2d 74, 81 (1997); Vereen v.
Holden, 121 N.C. App. 779, 784, 468 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1996); Lenzer v. Flaherty, 106 N.C.
App. 496,515,418 S.E.2d 276,287 (1992).
189. N.C. CONST. art. I. The Declaration of Rights is not an exhaustive list of rights.
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perhaps the most essential article of the North Carolina
Constitution.90 The courts have ascertained both the procedural and
substantive aspects of state constitutional claims.
A. Direct ConstitutionalClaimsAgainst State Officials
In Corum v. University of North Carolina,9' the Supreme Court
of North Carolina outlined the basis for proceeding directly under the
19
state constitution for a violation of state constitutional rights. 2
Initially, to proceed with such a claim, no alternative remedy under
state law may exist. 193 The defendant will always be a state official, 9 4
but the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be raised as an
affirmative defense to a state constitutional claim. 195 Although well
established in North Carolina, 96 sovereign immunity remains a
common law doctrine, and must bow to the supreme law of the state,

See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 36. Article I, section 36 resembles the Ninth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Compare N.C. CONST. art. I, § 36 ("The enumeration of rights
in this Article shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people."),
with U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). See JOHN V.
ORTH,

THE

NORTH

CAROLINA

STATE

CONSTITUTION

WITH

HISTORY

AND

COMMENTARY 77 (1993) (discussing the impetus for the addition of section 36).
190. See Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289. Indeed, the enumeration of rights
in a state constitution is even more essential than that in the Constitution of the United
States. The federal government can act only pursuant to specific grants of power included
in the federal Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend X; James Madison, Federalist 45:
Powers and Continuing Advantages of the States, in THE FEDERALIST 328 (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) (noting that the powers the Constitution delegates to the
federal government are "few and defined"); see, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
551 (1995) (holding that a provision of the Gun Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(qc(1)(A) (1994), exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause). On the
other hand, the states' police power is unlimited except when it conflicts with the United
States Constitution, valid federal laws and treaties, and, most importantly, states'
constitutions. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause); U.S. CONST. amend X
(reserving to the states the powers not delegated to the federal government); State v.
Whitaker, 228 N.C. 352, 362-63, 45 S.E.2d 860, 868 (1947) (describing the nature of the
states' police power).
191. 330 N.C. 761,413 S.E.2d 276 (1992).
192. Id.
193. Id- at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289. Because constitutional claims are extraordinary
exercises of jurisdiction, if a common law or statutory claim is available, a plaintiff cannot
proceed directly under the state constitution. Id.; Lorbacher, 127 N.C. App. at 675, 493
S.E.2d at 81 (1997) (holding that the plaintiffs constitutional claim was unwarranted
because she could, and did, assert a claim for wrongful discharge).
194. Only state officials may be made parties to constitutional claims, and only in their
official capacity. Corum, 330 N.C. at 788,413 S.E.2d at 293.
195. Id. at 785-86, 413 S.E.2d at 291.
196. See Moffit v. Asheville, 103 N.C. 237,254-55, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1889) (providing an
early explanation of sovereign immunity).
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Further, the Declaration of Rights

would be a mere nullity if those rights could not be enforced against
state officials. Indeed, the Constitution was intended to protect the

people's liberty from restraint by state officials. 9 '
Corum breathed life into the Declaration of Rights by providing
a means for redressing unconstitutional actions by the State and the

individuals who carry out State authority.199 It follows from Corum
that sheriffs are subject to the limitations of the state constitution in

Sheriffs'
their capacity as constitutionally elected officials a°
authority to appoint deputies is a grant from the government nearly
as ancient as the office of sheriff itself.2 '

The General Statutes

expressly provide for the appointment authority,202 in addition to its
common law roots.02 3 Because a sheriff acts under state authority
when employing deputies, if his actions interfere with deputies' rights
under the state constitution, the deputies may have a claim under
Corum. The question of what rights deputy sheriffs may take action
197. See Corum, 330 N.C. at 785-86, 413 S.E.2d at 292; State ex rel. Martin v. Preston,
325 N.C. 438,449,385 S.E.2d 473,478 (1989).
198. See Corum, 330 N.C. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 291. Although several passages in the
Corum opinion speak in terms of the rights of "North Carolina citizens," the Declaration
of Rights must protect all persons regardless of their citizenship. See U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 2, cl. 1; Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939) (noting that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibits states from favoring their own citizens at the
expense of other states' citizens); State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 144, 150
(1838) (holding that the state constitution protects "all amongst us who are recognized as
persons entitled to liberty").
199. The decision is not unique. Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court of the United
States recognized a direct claim for constitutional violations by federal officials. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,392
(1971). Other state courts have followed this lead as well. See Sharon N. Humble,
Annotation, Implied Cause of Action for Damages for Violation of Provisions of State
Constitutions, 75 A.L.R. 5th 619 (1990) (collecting cases using reasoning analogous to
Bivens to recognize an implied cause of action for monetary damages for state
constitutional violations). For an exhaustive treatment on the the subject of using civil
actions to enforce state constitutional rights, see generally 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, § 77(a), at 7-19 to 7-37 (3d ed. 2000).
200. N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (providing for the sheriff to be elected in each county).
201. See Gowens v. Alamance County, 216 N.C. 107, 109, 3 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1939)
(noting that deputies have been affiliated with sheriffs since "antiquity") (quoting Lanier
v. Greenville, 174 N.C. 311, 316, 93 S.E. 850, 853 (1919)); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES, *333-34 (describing the duties of the undersheriff); see also Lanier,174
N.C. at 316, 93 S.E. at 853 (noting that general deputies are the equivalent of
undersheriffs).
202. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 154A-103(b) (1999). The statute provides for at least two
deputies, and the counties' funding subsidizes any additional deputies. Id.
203. Gowens, 216 N.C. at 109, 3 S.E.2d at 340; State v. Jones, 41 N.C. App. 189, 190,
254 S.E.2d 234,235 (1979).
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upon in response to political patronage practices remains to be
examined.
B. The Rights Implicated by PatronagePractices

In general, political patronage practices implicate three liberties:
freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of belief.
Patronage comes in many forms and can implicate these interests to

differing degrees in any particular case. For example, if a deputy runs
negative campaign ads against his current boss, a retaliatory
termination implicates the deputy's free speech right.2" On the other

hand, if a Republican sheriff fires a deputy who is an open, but not
vocally supportive, member of the Democratic party, this implicates
the deputy's free association rights. In yet another scenario, a deputy
who exhibits Republican views but is not affiliated with the party
suffers a deprivation of freedom of belief upon being terminated.
In theory, these hypothetical scenarios are helpful to illustrate
the ways in which patronage practice can impact an individual's
rights, but in reality the lines are blurred. Most cases involve each of
the three rights to some degree. Because an individual who has
exercised freedom of speech generally has exercised freedom of belief

as well,20 5 an appropriate inquiry is whether expression or ideology
motivated the dismissal.2 6 For example, if a sheriff dismisses a
deputy for having placed an opposing candidate's propaganda on his
204. Cf Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691,706-08 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying the
Pickering-Connickbalance to deputies terminated for supporting the candidate opposing
the incumbent sheriff). This does not mean that the deputy would prevail. Although
Justice Holmes's statement that a person "may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman" is no longer absolutely correct, it still
captures the essence of a case where a public employee's speech is outweighed by the
state's interest. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). See,
e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) (upholding the termination of a public
employee who circulated a questionnaire that partially touched matters of public concern).
But see O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716-17 (1996) (explaining
that a government employee's job cannot be conditioned upon the employee's exercise of
her First Amendment rights).
205. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(explaining that free public discussion is essential to an effective democracy); THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 23 (Everymans' Library ed. 1950) (1651) (noting that the general
use of speech is to express one's thoughts). Hobbes's suggestion may not always be the
case. For example, when a person advocates an idea in which that person does not
actually believe, this would not express the person's true thoughts.
206. See, e.g., Largo v. Vacco, 977 F. Supp. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that the
plaintiff medical fraud investigators were never questioned about their political ideologies
before being hired); Ortiz Pinero v. Rivera Acevedo, 900 F. Supp. 574, 578 (D.P.R. 1995)
(explaining that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that political affiliation motivated
plaintiff's dismissal).

2001]

POLITICAL PATRONAGE

1769

lawn, such dismissal may involve the deputy's rights of free speech,

association, and belief equally. But the analysis should focus on the
sheriff's motivation, whether it was the disruption caused by the
display, the deputy's belief that the opposing candidate would make a
better sheriff, or the deputy's political support of the other
candidate.2°7
Nevertheless, determining the permissibility of
patronage practices involving deputy sheriffs under the North
Carolina State Constitution, requires an examination of the scope of
these rights. Freedom of speech heads the inquiry because, as
discussed below, it leads to freedom of belief.
C. The Substance of the Declarationof Right's Freedom of Speech
Clause
Among other things, section fourteen of the Declaration of
Rights prohibits state officials from restraining public employees'
freedom of speech.20 8 Deputies who allege they were fired because of
their expression may state a claim for relief.209 Claims of this sort do
not necessarily fall into the category of patronage, however. The
deputy's termination may have nothing to do with politics or party
affiliation. In such cases in which patronage is not an issue, North
Carolina courts will likely apply the Pickering-Connick balancing
0
On
approach to decide public employee freedom of speech rights. 21
207. See Largo, 977 F. Supp. at 271; Ortiz Pinero,900 F. Supp. at 578.
208. N.C. CONST. art I, § 14; Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761,789,413 S.E.2d 276,
293 (1992) (noting that only state officials acting in their official capacity may be sued
under the state constitution).
209. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289; Evans v. Cowan, 132 N.C. App. 1, 8,
510 S.E.2d 170, 175 (1999). Describing the scope of freedom of speech rights in public
employee cases is conceptually complex. Generally, all persons have the right to be free
from penal sanctions or monetary damages based on the content of their speech. See
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). But a few exceptions exist. See, e.g.,
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that the Constitution does not
shield obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (noting that libelous
statements are not protected); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 57-72 (1942)
(noting that the Constitution does not protect " 'fighting' words"). However, public
employees have the right to be free from adverse employment action based on their
expression on matters of public concern, if this right is not outweighed by a government
interest. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983); Evans, 132 N.C. App at 9, 510
S.E.2d at 175.
210. See, e.g., Evans, 132 N.C. App. at 9, 510 S.E.2d at 175-76. Several factors might
inspire a court to apply the Pickering-Connickbalance to decide a state constitutional
claim. Limited judicial resources might prevent a court from attempting to invent a new
test that protects free speech more under the state constitution than the federal
Constitution. Further, in Evans, the only case applying the state constitution to public
employee free speech, the court was forced to address the issue. The appellant's federal
free speech claims were res judicata following a grant of summary judgment. See Evans v.
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the other hand, courts have not addressed in any substantive manner
those situations in which expression is not an issue, and thus, the
Pickering-Connickapproach is inapplicable.2 n
Because state courts have not addressed patronage claims under
the Declaration of Rights, relevant case law might indicate how such
claims would or should be decided. In Vereen v. Holden,1" the North
Carolina Court of Appeals indicated that firing a public employee
based on political activity and affiliation would violate the state
The court did not mention which provision of the
constitution.
state constitution this activity contravened,2 14 but it likely derives, at
least in part, from the free speech guarantee of article one, section
fourteen of the state constitution.215 Because in a raw patronage case,
Cowan, 122 N.C. App. 181, 182,468 S.E.2d 575,576 (1996).
211. The state appellate courts have ruled on a few patronage cases. In Powell v. N.C.
Dept. of Trans., 347 N.C. 614, 499 S.E.2d 180 (1998), the supreme court upheld the
dismissal of the Director of the State Highway Beautification Council. Governor Hunt
wanted a political confidant to serve in the post, so he requested the official's termination.
Id. at 619, 499 S.E.2d at 182. The director was designated "policymaking exempt" from
the State Personnel Act because of the political nature of her job. Id. at 619-20, 499
S.E.2d at 182-83. The director contested the decision of the State Personnel Commission
and raised an alternative claim under Elrod and Branti. Id. at 625, 499 S.E.2d at 186. The
supreme court upheld the dismissal because the director was essentially the "eyes and
ears" of the governor's administration and public spokesperson for the program. Id.
212. 121 N.C. App. 779,468 S.E.2d 471 (1996).
213. See id. at 784, 468 S.E.2d at 474 (citing State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 769, 51
S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949)).
214. See Vereen, 121 N.C. App. at 784, 468 S.E.2d at 474 (citing State v. Ballance, 229
N.C. 764, 769, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949)). Ballance considered whether the legislature
could constitutionally require that photographers obtain a license. Ballance, 229 N.C. at
766, 51 S.E.2d at 732. The case is illustrative even though it did not involve freedom of
speech or patronage. It touched on the area of substantive due process, a theory which the
United States Supreme Court essentially had abandoned more than a decade earlier. See
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). The Ballancecourt applied three provisions of the state
constitution to invalidate the photography licensing law. 229 N.C. at 768-69, 51 S.E.2d at
733. One of these provisions appears to be an express textual basis for economic
substantive due process. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1; ORTH, supra note 189, at 38-39. The
court noted that another provision was intended to require the government to respect
individual freedom. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 768,51 S.E.2d at 733-34 (citing N.C. CONST. of
1868 art. I, § 29). If anything, Ballance illustrates North Carolina courts' traditional
willingness to protect individual rights where the federal Constitution does not.
215. N.C. Const. art I, § 14. Cf Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515 (1980) (holding that
the First Amendment's free speech clause protects public employees from discharge due
to their beliefs). Deputies cannot rely on the "Law of the Land" clause of the Declaration
of Rights in any employment context, including patronage. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19
(stating that "[n]o person shall be... in any manner deprived of his... life, liberty, or
property, but by the law of the land"). In at-will employment cases, which include
employment of deputies, the claim will fail because an at-will employee has no property
interest in his employment. Evans v. Cowan, 132 N.C. App. 1, 8, 510 S.E.2d 170, 175

2001]

POLITICAL PATRONAGE

1771

the deputy does not utter a single word 216 or otherwise express his
thoughts, 217 the termination does not, strictly speaking, implicate
"speech," it implicates belief.218 Freedom of speech, however,
necessarily entails freedom of belief. 19 An alternative to this
proposition would permit the state to declare that a person has the
right to speak what he thinks, but he dare not believe it. But if
citizens are free to speak their minds, the obvious assumption is that
they may believe what they state as well. Further, speech is afforded
protection, in part, as a means to the end of freedom of belief.2
Rather than being incidental, belief is incident to freedom of speech.
This assertion mandates a thorough examination of the Declaration
of Right's free speech clause.
Relative to federal law, North Carolina law has not delineated
the boundaries and contours of freedom of speech in any
comprehensive fashion. A number of factors explain the lack of

(1999); Lorbacher v. Hous. Auth., 127 N.C. App. 663,675,493 S.E.2d 74, 81 (1997).
216. See McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.3d 1009, 1014 (1984).
217. The First Amendment protects expression without utterance, although somewhat
differently than affirmative speech. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,381 (1992)
(holding that cross-burning is protected by the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (holding that the First Amendment protects burning an American
flag); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974) (holding that attaching a peace sign
to an American flag is protected by the First Amendment); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (noting that burning a draft card may be expressive conduct but
upholding defendant's conviction); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931)
(holding that the First Amendment protects an individual who salutes the Communist
flag).
218. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,515 (1980).
219. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457,471 (1997); Stanley v.
Ga., 394 U.S. 557,565-66 (1969); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,531 (1945); W.Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); BAKER, supra note 33, at 47-50; EMERSON, supra note
33, at 6; Meiklejohn, supra note 33, at 255; cf MILL, supra note 33, at 18 (asserting that
"liberty of expressi[on] ... being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought
itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practially inseparable from it");
ZENGER'S JOURNAL PRESENTS "CATO," in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO
JEFFERSON 10, 11-12 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Carolina Academic Press 1996) (1966)

(claiming that "[w]ithout Freedom of Thought, there can be no such Thing as Wisdom,
and no such Thing as public Liberty, without Freedom of Speech").
220. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446,2447 (2000) (quoting Whitney,
274 U.S. at 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). Justice Brandeis's explication, in
Whitney, on the purpose of the First Amendment, is possibly the most important and
powerful description ever provided. Vincent Blasi, The FirstAmendment and the Ideal of
Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV.
653, 690-91 (1988). Justice Brandeis noted that the framers "valued liberty as both an
ends and a means [and] believed that freedom to think as you will and speak as you think
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth." Whitney, 274 U.S.
at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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Constitutional
continuity in the freedom of speech arena.
adjudication was relatively rare before the middle of the nineteenth
century."1 Prior to 1971, the state constitution did not enumerate
freedom of speech.'m

Further, little need existed to determine

3
whether the right to freedom of speech was an unenumerated right,2

because, since 1925, the free speech clause of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution has applied to the states through the

Furthermore, between the 1971
Fourteenth Amendment. 24
amendment's enactment and the Corum decision, whether a civil
remedy for restraints on freedom of speech was available under
section fourteen was unclear.' Plaintiffs, therefore, have relied more
heavily on federal free speech rights than state constitutional rights.

6

Such reliance seems fruitless for deputy sheriffs considering that
Jenkins' holding would bar their federal patronage claims in United
States courts.l 7 Thus, following Jenkins, deputies' primary protection
in the patronage context must come from the state constitution.
In construing the state constitution, especially when a parallel
provision exists in the federal Constitution,2 North Carolina courts
221. ORTH, supra note 189, at 7.
222. Id. at 51.
223. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 36 (asserting that the enumerated rights "shall not be
construed to impair or deny others retained by the people"); see also N.C. CONST. of 1868
art. I, § 37 (containing a similar provision).
224. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,235 (1963); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 664 (1925). Prior to Gitlow, the First Amendment was not applicable to the
states. In fact, prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, no Bill of Rights provision was
applicable to the states. See Barron v. Bat., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (Marshall,
C.J.); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193, 1198-1218 (1992) (describing the incorporation debate prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment's adoption).
225. See Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 97 N.C. App. 527, 537, 389 S.E.2d 596, 601 (1990)
(holding that sovereign immunity barred a suit for restraint to freedom of speech against a
state university and its officials), rev'd, 330 N.C. 761, 789, 413 S.E.2d 276, 293 (1992)
(establishing that the state constitution provides a remedy for violations of the freedom of
speech clause).
226. See Harry C. Martin, Freedom of Speech in North CarolinaPriorto Gitlow v. New
York, with a Forward Glance Thereafter, 4 CAMPBELL L. REv. 243, 251-53 (1982)
[hereinafter, Martin, Freedom of Speech].
227. Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d. 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
228. A Declaration of Rights provision may be parallel, yet not necessarily identical to
a federal Consitutional provision. Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (prohibiting
states from passing "any Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law") with N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 16 (providing that "[r]etrospective laws, punishing acts committed before the existence
of such laws and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust, and incompatible
with liberty, and therefore no ex post facto law shall be enacted"). Both provisions
address the same evil, and state courts would likely interpret the provision similarly to
how the Supreme Court interprets the federal provision. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (describing a bill of attainder as a legislatively inflicted
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First, courts can construe the

federal and state provisions in precisely the same way, that is, in exact
accordance with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation.

9

Second, because Supreme Court precedent is merely persuasive
authority and does not bind North Carolina courts to a particular
construction,20 state courts may construe the state constitution to
afford more protection than the federal Constitution 31 In any event,
with respect to patronage discharges of deputy sheriffs, North
Carolina state courts may take either of these approaches.
Regardless of the method of construction they choose, though, state

courts should grant deputies an individualized inquiry under the state
constitution by examining the individual deputy's duties and the
nature of the political rights exercised that prompted the dismissal,
notwithstanding Jenkins v. Medford.
In light of the conflicting decisions in the United States Courts of
Appeals with regard to political patronage practices in the
employment of deputy sheriffs, 32 and the fact that the blanket rule of
Jenkins is neither binding nor necessarily persuasive, North Carolina
courts have considerable latitude in applying the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution in those circumstances3 s
Nonetheless, North Carolina courts and practitioners should rely on
the state rather than the federal Constitution. Reliance on the state
constitution will bring more finality to a particular case *- and provide
punishment without trial).
229. See State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 184, 432 S.E.2d 832, 841 (1993) (adopting the
United States Supreme Court's First Amendment interpretation in a section fourteen
claim involving campaign propaganda); State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 178, 273 S.E.2d 708,
712 (1981) (declining to interpret section fourteen to grant greater protection than the
First Amendment in a trespassing case).
230. Petersilie,334 N.C. at 184,432 S.E.2d at 841.
231. See Felmet, 302 N.C. at 178, 273 S.E.2d at 713; see, e.g., State v. Carter, 322 N.C.
709, 724, 370 S.E.2d 553, 562 (1988) (holding that there is no good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule under the North Carolina Constitution even though there is under the
federal Constitution). See generally Harry C. Martin, The State as a "Font of Individual
Liberties": North Carolina Accepts the Challenge, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1749, 1751-57 (1992)
(advocating the virtues of providing greater rights under the state constitution).
232. See supra notes 76-118 (discussing the circuit split).
233. North Carolina courts are bound only to decisions construing the federal
Constitution by the United States Supreme Court's precedent. Although the federal
courts of appeals' decisions (including the Fourth Circuit's) are persuasive, state courts are
not obligated to follow them. See State v. Davis, 267 N.C. 429, 431, 148 S.E.2d 250, 251
(1966); State v. Barnes, 264 N.C. 517,521,142 S.E.2d 344,347 (1965).
234. Under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), if a state court's decision rests on
adequate and independent state grounds, the United States Supreme Court will not have
jurisdiction to review the decision even if it relies on federal case law as persuasive
authority. Id. at 1041. To avoid review, however, the court should make it "clear by a
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clear state precedent for future questionable patronage practicesP-5
the state
Therefore, necessity demands an examination of
constitution's substantive support for protection from patronage.
In construing section fourteen's freedom of speech provision, or
any provision of the North Carolina Constitution for that matter, the
courts are charged with determining the intent of the framers and
a
voters who adopted it. 6 Because ascribing a collective intent to 37
group of numerous individuals is a daunting enterprise, the text of,
and historical background relating to freedom of speech under the
state constitution are of primary importanceP 8
Although a relatively recent addition to the state constitution,
the free speech clause of the Declaration of Rights lends support to
the assertion that patronage cases demand an individualized inquiry.
North Carolina lawyers drafted the clause with laypersons'
assistance, 39 and the voters ratified it in 1971 as part of a substantial
revision to the existing constitution. 240 The constitution's Study
Commission made little mention of the free speech clause in
particular, but noted that the Declaration of Rights includes most of
its new provisions to recognize rights already in existence.241 Federal
free speech rights certainly were well established by this time, but the

plain statement in its judgment or opinion that federal cases are being used only for the
purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that court has reached." Id.
235. See FRIESEN, supra note 199, at § 1-3(c) to 1-13.
236. See Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 787, 413 S.E.2d 276, 293 (1992)
(explaining that the Declaration of Rights was meant to protect fundamental rights from
state encroachment); Martin v. State, 330 N.C. 412, 415-16, 410 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1991)
(quoting State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 583, 31 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1944)); Sneed v.
Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 613, 264 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1980); Floyd v.
Lumberton City Bd.of Educ., 71 N.C. App. 670,677; 324 S.E.2d 18,24 (1984); cf ROBERT
H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 251-59 (1990) (describing the flaws inherent in all
interpretive theories of the federal Constitution that depart from the original
understanding); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 862
(1989) (justifying originalism as the proper method for interpreting the federal
Constitution).
237. Corum, 330 N.C. at 787, 413 S.E.2d at 293; Martin,330 N.C. at 415-16,410 S.E.2d
at 476; State ex reL Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438,449,385 S.E.2d 473,478 (1989).
238. Martin, 330 N.C. at 415-16, 410 S.E.2d at 476; Floyd, 71 N.C. App. at 677, 324
S.E.2d at 24; see also Corum, 330 N.C. at 787, 413 S.E.2d at 293 (discussing the history of
the Declaration of Rights).
239. REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE STUDY COMMISSION TO THE NORTH

CAROLINA STATE BAR AND THE NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION 2 (1968)
[hereinafter STUDY COMMISSION REPORT].

240. ORTH, supra note 189, at 20,51.
241. See STUDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 239, at 30.
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extent to42which state free speech rights enjoyed similar protection is

unclear

Section fourteen provides that, "[f]reedom of speech and of the
press are two of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall
never be restrained, but every person shall be held responsible for
their abuse. '243 Prior constitutions contained this same general form,
It is illustrative,
but omitted the words "freedom of speech."'
of the press
freedom
of
therefore to examine the history and nature
under the Declaration of Rights.
English common law protected freedom of the press, but only in
a limited sense. Its protection was confined to freedom from prior
restraints 45 Thus, a person could avoid the censor, but not the
sheriff. Even Blackstone noted, however, that a person's thoughts
246 Freedom of the press
were not subject to restriction in this context.
under the Declaration of Rights constituted more than mere freedom
from prior restraint, however; it prohibited the state from attempting
2 47
to suppress public opinion or criticism of the government.
Nevertheless, libelous publications were not protected. The language
the freedom2 4 was
calling for responsibility for those who abused
2 49
meant to protect persons from defamation.

242. See Martin, Freedom of Speech, supra note 226, at 1756-57 (discussing freedom of
speech in North Carolina prior to 1921).
243. N.C. CONsT. art I, § 14.
244. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights § 15; N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I,
§ 20 (adding the provision that "every individual shall be held responsible for [its] abuse").
245. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 201, at *151-52.
246. Id at *152. But cf. Statute of Treasons, 1315-52, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2 (providing
that "when a Man doth compass or imagine the Death of... the King" he commits
treason).
247. See Cowan v. Fairbrother, 118 N.C. 406,417,24 S.E. 212,215 (1896). In the years
preceding the Civil War, North Carolina was not so forgiving when it came to criticism of
government policies. In 1860, a minister was convicted of circulating an incendiary
publication pursuant to N.C. REV. STAT., ch. 34 § 16 (1854). See State v. Worth, 52 N.C.
(7 Jones) 488, 493 (1860). The publication, HINTON ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING
CRISIS OF THE SOUTH: HOW TO MEET IT (1857), provided a general denouncement of
slavery, and suggestions for implementing its abolition. For a general discussion of the
Worth case, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING
PRIVILEGE" STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 271-99

(2000).
248. N.C. CONST. art I, § 14 (noting that notwithstanding the freedoms, "every person
shall be held responsible for their abuse").
249. Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 629, 47 S.E. 811, 812 (1904) (holding that the
legislature cannot impair the right to recover for defamation); cf. Wheeler v. Green, 593
P.2d 777, 778 (Or. 1979) (holding that the abuse clause of the Oregon constitution allows
an action for defamation and recovery of compensatory damages).
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Freedom of the press has been enumerated specifically in the

Declaration of Rights since 1776,10 but garnered little consideration
from the Supreme Court prior to 1971, other than the few cases noted
above. Although not enumerated, the free speech concept generated
nearly as much attention. Indeed, certain cases point to free speech
as being within the corpus of North Carolina common law, 1s or
within the state constitution, notwithstanding its absence from the
Declaration of Rights. 2 For example, in Seawell v. Carolina Central
RailroadCo., the court explicitly stated that the state constitution and
laws protect freedom of speech.Y3 Of particular significance in the
patronage context was that the Seawell plaintiff expressed a political
opinion. 4 In State v. Wiggins, four years prior to enumeration of the
freedom of speech right, the court noted that freedom of speech
always has always enjoyed fundamental status, even before the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 5
Even in light of the history of freedom of speech in North
Carolina, the purpose behind the freedom of speech clause's
ratification remains unclear. It may have been simply a recognition of
the importance of the freedom of speech that the federal Constitution
250. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights § 15.
251. See Martin, Freedom of Speech, supra note 226, at 250.
252. See State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 157-58, 158 S.E.2d 37, 45 (1967); Seawell v.
Carolina Cent. R.R. Co., 133 N.C. 515,45 S.E. 850,851 (1903); Martin, Freedom of Speech,
supra note 226, at 250.
253. 133 N.C. at 516, 45 S.E. at 851. This statement may seem odd because in 1903
freedom of speech was neither enumerated in the state constitution, see 1903 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1-4, nor conferred in a state statute. See Martin, Freedom of Speech, supranote 226,
at 268. It seems doubtful that Chief Justice Clark overlooked this contradiction.
Although the court did not indicate the source of the principle it announced, a number of
possibilities exist. First, the court may have relied on the North Carolina common law as a
protector of free speech. Id Second, the court may have considered freedom of speech so
obviously a part of the law that stating its source would be unnecessary. Id Finally,
fundamental to the Declaration of Rights, even at that time, was the concept that the
enumeration of rights is not exhaustive. See N.C. CONST. of 1886 art. I, § 37 ("This
enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained by the
people."). Thus, freedom of speech may have been a residual right under the state
constitution.
254. 133 N.C. at 515; 45 S.E. at 851. A crowd of people pelted a candidate for
lieutenant governor with eggs simply because of his party affiliation. Id According to the
court, "nothing could be more unmanly than a mob assailing one man in such a manner
for his difference from them in their political opinions." Id. The defendant, as a quasipublic corporation, was held to a stricter duty than that of a private citizen. Id. at 516-17,
45 S.E. at 851. "Such attempted intimidation for political opinion's sake cannot be safely
permitted, especially by great public corporations holding their franchises, in trust,
impartially, for the public." Id. at 517,45 S.E. at 851.
255. 272 N.C. at 157, 158 S.E.2d at 45 (1967). The court noted that freedom of speech
is not absolute. Id.
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already protects,1 6 or a reaction to the infamous "speaker ban law,"

7

which prohibited, among other things, speaking on state-supported
campuses

by

known

members

of

the

Communist

party

5

Alternatively, the drafters may have meant to give greater protection
to free speech than the federal Constitution and prior North Carolina
laws provided. The plain language, and a Study Commission Report
on the free speech section both support the last possibilityY 9 Section
fourteen offers a rationale for the protection given freedom of
speech, calling it a "bulwark" of liberty.26 The First Amendment to
the United States Constitution contains no such rationale.2 6' Further,

section fourteen's text is not limited to laws passed by the legislature,
unlike the First Amendment. 2 62 Rather, it uses the imperative "shall
never be restrained. '263 One could argue, ignoring precedent and
256. JOHN L. SANDERS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH
CAROLINA 6 (1972).
257. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116-199, -200 (Supp. 1994), repealed by Act of July 6,
1995, ch. 379, § 17, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 933, 942; Martin, Freedom of Speech, supra note
226, at 227 n.209.
258. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-199 (Supp. 1994), repealedby Act of July 6, 1995, ch. 379,
sec. 17, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 933, 942. The statute provided for regulations governing the
speaking on public universities by "known member[s] of the Communist Party," "known
[advocates of] the overthrow of the Constitution of the United States or the State of North
Carolina," and persons who have pleaded the Fifth Amendment "in refusing to answer
any question, with respect to Communist or subversive connections." § 116-199(1)-(3). A
three-judge panel on the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina held the statute unconstitutionally vague. See Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp.
486, 498 (M.D.N.C. 1968). For a broad discussion of the speaker ban law, see generally
RACE, POLITICS, AND THE
WILLIAM J. BILLINGSLEY, COMMUNISTS ON CAMPUS:
PUBLIC UNIVERSITY IN SIXTIES NORTH CAROLINA (1999) 1-21; Gene R. Nichol, Bill
Aycock and the North CarolinaSpeaker Ban Law, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1725 (2001).
259. See STUDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 239, at 1-2 ("[I]t is necessary that a
state constitution be amended from time to time as problems arise that were not
contemplated when the constitution was drafted, or as old solutions prove inadequate to
The Constitution Study
governmental problems in their new manifestations.").
Commission explained its approach to the amendments to the Declaration of Rights by
saying "[w]e have sought.., to express [the ancient guarantees of liberty] in some
instances in more direct and understandable language, and in a few instances, to augment
them by adding similar guarantees of a more current character." IL at 30.
260. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14. A "bulwark" is "something that offers strong support or
protection in danger: a powerful means of defense: an imposing safeguard." WEBSTER'S,
supra note 154, at 295.
261. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
262. Id Indeed the words, "Congress shall make no law" are given little significance,
especially where non-legislative actions are in issue.
263. N.C. CONST art. I, § 14. Although the prior constitution used the words "ought"
rather than "shall," courts construed the suggestive wording of the original Declaration of
Rights as an imperative. See Smith v. Campbell, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 590, 597 (1825). The
drafters changed the language from admonitions to commands in order to clarify this
ambiguity. STUDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 239, at 30.
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history, that the First Amendment conjoined with the Fourteenth
merely prohibits legislative enactments that abridge freedom of
speech. 264 However, section fourteen's text does not lend itself to
such a limited interpretation. Instead, it facially limits any state
action restraining freedom of speech. In this vein, section fourteen
compels a particularized inquiry into the state action alleged to
restrain an individual's freedom of speech. As the court noted in
Corum, the words guarantee a direct and personal freedom to each
individual. 265 Thus, whether protected coextensively or more broadly
than freedom of speech under the First Amendment, section fourteen
requires an individual inquiry.
Section fourteen is not merely limited to private individuals'
freedom from criminal prosecution or prior restraint. It also governs
discharge from public employment in retaliation of speech.266 In one
public employee free speech case, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals applied a Pickering-Connicktype balance, which provides an
individualized inquiry into the speech at issue and the employment in
question 67 The courts should, and likely will, continue to follow this
case when confronted with state freedom of speech claims of a similar
character. Public employee belief deserves similar protection. The
point at which freedom of belief emerges from the North Carolina
Constitution, however, should be identified first.
D. Freedom of Belief Under the North Carolina Constitution
As a matter of moral and political philosophy, freedom of belief
268
or of opinion can be justified as an independent concept of liberty,
as a basis for free government,269 and as a rationale for freedom of
264. This argument relies on the First Amendment's reference to "Congress," not its
reference to "law." The definition of "Congress" is easily ascertainable by reference to
the body of the Constitution.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (providing that
"Congress... shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives"); id. § 2-3
(establishing in detail the makeup of the House and Senate). Similarly, it would seem to
apply equally to state legislatures through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, the Constitution's text does not clearly limit the definition of "law." See,
e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (providing that after a bill passes through the bicameralism and
presentment hurdles, it "shall become a law," but not clarifying whether the term "law" is
exclusive to bills which pass these hurdles).
265. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761,781,413 S.E.2d 276,289 (1992).
266. Evans v. Cowan, 132 N.C. App. 1, 8, 510 S.E.2d 170, 175 (1999); Corum, 330 N.C.
at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290.
267. See Evans, 132 N.C. App. at 9,510 S.E.2d at 175.
268. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 33, at 207-08 (1971) (arguing that
"equal liberty of conscience" is the only principle that persons in the original position can
acknowledge).
269. See 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 8-12 (Alfred A.
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speech.2 70 At first glance, it would seem that the freedom to think
what one wishes requires no justification2 7 ' In part, people take
freedom of belief for granted, because mankind has yet to fashion a
device that can read minds. Because the text and history of the
constitution probably have more influence on state court judges than
272 however, a basis for
the propositions of moral philosophers,
freedom of belief must be found in the language and background of
the Declaration of Rights.
Although section fourteen marks the most significant basis for
freedom of belief, certain other provisions of the Declaration of
The Declaration aims to establish
Rights also deserve mention 7
274 and courts construe its provisions broadly where individual
liberty,
rights are in question.27 5 The primary inquiry is whether restraint of
belief is a peculiar evil that the constitution's provisions sought to
prevent.276 The Declaration of Rights employs the term "liberty"
throughout,2 7 7 and in order to secure that liberty, it also requires a
278 Because neither
"frequent recurrence to fundamental principles."
of these terms' meaning is plain, the state constitution's other
27 9
provisions provide the best source for determining their meaning.
Knopf ed. 1994).
270. See MILL, supra note 33, at 18. Mill aptly described the domain of human liberty
as encompassing both freedom of pure opinion, and the equally significant and practically
inseparable concept of freedom to express one's opinions. Id
271. One's private, unexpressed beliefs are essentially beyond the realm of another's
cognizance.
272. Indeed, counsel would not likely meet with much success citing Mill, Rawls, and
Tocqueville, to the exclusion of case law and constitutional provisions in a court brief.
273. See State ex. rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 449, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989)
(interpreting the state constitution to require the observance of " 'all cognate
provisions' ") (quoting State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 438,449,31 S.E.2d 858,860 (1944)).
274. N.C. CONST. art. I, pmbl.; State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764,768, 51 S.E.2d 731,73334 (1949).
275. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761,783,413 S.E.2d 276,290 (1992).
276. Moore v. Knightdale Bd. of Elections, 331 N.C. 1, 9, 413 S.E.2d 541, 545 (1992);
Comer v. Ammons, 135 N.C. App. 531,541,522 S.E.2d 77, 83 (1999).
277. See N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 1 (liberty is an "inalienable" right), 13 (religious
liberty), 14 (freedom of speech and press are "bulwarks of liberty"), 16 (ex post facto laws
are "incompatible with liberty"), 19 (liberties shall not be disseized or "in any manner
deprived"), 20 (general warrants are "dangerous to liberty"), 21 (persons restrained of
their liberty are "entitled to a remedy to inquire into the lawfulness therof"), 30 (standing
armies are "dangerous to liberty"), 35 ("A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles
is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty.").
278. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35.
279. See State ex. reL Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 449, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989)
(quoting State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 438, 449, 31 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1944)); Virmani v.
Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 127 N.C. App. 629, 637, 493 S.E.2d 310, 316 (1997); see
also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,112 HARV.L. REv. 747,788-95 (1999) (describing
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The history behind section twenty-nine, which defines treason
against the state, shows that it is one provision that protects liberty of
belief and opinion.m0 Although English common law punished a
person for merely "imagining the death of... the King,"' 1 both the
federal and North Carolina Constitutions limit their definitions of
treason.? This lays the groundwork for a freedom to imagine what
283
one will.
Section thirteen, which promotes religious liberty, contains an
explicit reference to freedom of belief. It provides that "no human
authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience." Although section thirteen actually refers to
belief in the Almighty,u 5 it nevertheless serves to illustrate the
importance that people placed on liberty of inward belief.
Section fourteen lends the greatest support to free belief. The
concept of freedom of belief or opinion, was well established as a core
principle behind the First Amendment at the time section fourteen
was ratified.z 6 This tends to support freedom of belief's inclusion in
section fourteen, even if the 1971 amendments to the Declaration of
Rights were intended merely to recognize previously established
freedoms.2
The text of section fourteen, in connection with the other
Declaration of Rights provisions noted above, gives even greater
support for the inclusion of freedom of belief, providing that the
freedoms of speech and press "are two of the great bulwarks of
a theory of constitutional interpretation through which the meaning of constitutional
terms is discerned by reference to similar or identical terms in the document's other
provisions).
280. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 29.
281. Statute of Treasons, 1315-52, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2. As Blackstone noted,
because thoughts are essentially shrouded from outward recognition, proof of treason
could only be proven by overt acts. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 201, at *79. One
unfortunate fellow, the keeper of the Crown inn, was drawn and quartered under the
statute for telling his son, "if thou behavest thyself well, I will make thee heir to the
Crown." LORD CAMPBELL, 1 LivEs OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 151-52 (rev.
ed. 1874).
282. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 29.
283. Cf William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of
Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 115-117 (1984) (describing the treason clause as a
protection of free speech).
284. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
285. Id.
286. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 531 (1945); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357,375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
287. SANDERS, supra note 256, at 6.
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liberty." 8 This language demonstrates that the speech and press
provisions were intended as a prophylaxis for the concept of liberty.
Beliefs inclusion in the liberty concept is essentially self-evident,
because if one is free to speak his opinion, one must necessarily be
permitted to think it.1 9 Furthermore, inasmuch as freedom of belief
is coterminous with freedom of speech, it requires an individualized
inquiry.
Freedom of belief's protection is hardly controversial. In today's
society, no right-thinking court or legislature would allow criminal
conviction solely based on a person's Democratic or Republican
beliefs. However, because "[a]ll rights tend to declare themselves
absolute to their logical extreme," the inquiry into freedom of belief
is not over 2 ° Threat of employment loss is significantly less coercive
than the threat of penal sanctions. A person's political beliefs should
have no relevance to his standing in society, but in many cases
political belief is relevant to a particular occupation. 291 Nevertheless,
freedom of political belief enjoys such fundamental status under the
state constitution that it should not be the subject of an employment
qualification without a compelling justification; that is, it should only
factor into an employment decision when the employee's effective
performance requires conformity of political belief.
E. An Individualized Inquiry is the Only Appropriate Method for
Ascertaining the Validity of Patronage Practices with Respect to
Deputy Sheriffs Underthe North CarolinaConstitution
Patronage claims warrant an individual approach, rather than the
blanket rule laid out in Jenkins v. Medford.2 ' Under the Jenkins rule,
the inquiry into the validity of patronage practices in North Carolina
sheriffs' offices is easy. One simply asks whether the sheriff s
employee is a deputy sworn to enforce state law.293 If the answer is
yes, then patronage raises no constitutional problem.294 If the
employee is not a sworn law enforcement officer, such as a detention

288. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 14.
289. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
290. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,355 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
291. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 445 U.S. 507,517-19 (1980) (explaining
that a political belief is relevant to a political speechwriter's position).
292. 119 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
293. Id. at 1165.
294. Id. at 1164.
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officer, then patronage is inappropriate.2 95 So long as they know an
employee's position, lawyers and laypersons alike can undertake this
uncomplicated analysis to determine the appropriateness of a sheriff's
actions in a variety of circumstances. Categorical rules offer obvious
benefits to judges and lawyers in many areas of the law. But a
flexible approach seems more appropriate in the patronage context,
because patronage so heavily implicates freedom of belief, and
because freedom of belief conjoins with freedom of speech in the
North Carolina Constitution.2 96 As the analysis in this section
demonstrates, courts employing this standard should consider the
deputy's specific position and the nature of the rights exercised 97
In Jenkins, the Fourth Circuit stated that only a position-specific
analysis is appropriate, and purported to apply this analysis to the
plaintiff deputies.29 The court, however, conceptualized the position
as that of a North Carolina deputy sheriff.2 99 This general category
contrasts with the more specific and individual characterization that
the court could have chosen as the appropriate category, namely a
deputy in the same county with the same duties as the particular
plaintiff deputy. The latter conception is more appropriate for
purposes of the North Carolina Constitution, because the former over
relies on a single common factor shared by all of the state's more than
5,000 deputies:3°° the ability to enforce the law. 01 This single factor
does not always dictate whether political conformity with the sheriff
constitutes an appropriate job requirement.
Under Fourth Circuit law, a dichotomy exists in the patronage
context between sworn deputies and other employees of the sheriff.302
Consequentially, the deputies' law enforcement duties dictate
whether claims against a sheriff will receive a categorical analysis,
regardless of whether a deputy's views affect her job performance. 3
This factor's relevance varies in different cases.3 4
295. See, e.g., Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544,548 (2000) (en banc) (holding that North
Carolina jailers cannot be dismissed for patronage reasons).
296. See supra notes 269-91 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 298-326 and accompanying text.
298. Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1164.
299. Id300. See MAPS GROUP, supra note 153, at 36-47.
301. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 12, r. 10B.0103 (14) (June 2000).
302. CompareJenkins, 119 F.3d at 1164 (holding that sworn deputies may be dismissed
on patronage grounds), with Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544, 548 (2000) (en banc)
(holding that North Carolina jailers cannot be dismissed for patronage reasons).
303. See Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1165 (limiting its holding to sworn law enforcement

officers).
304. In fact, one sheriff admitted on the witness stand in a patronage case against him
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The state constitution presumes that sheriffs' political beliefs
bear on the exercise of their law enforcement powers. 305 Disregarding
mere party preference, a sheriff's victory in an election indicates that
county voters felt that his prior reputation or political platform was
proper law enforcement policy for the county 3 6 In that sense, the
sheriff may be entitled to rely on the deputies to whom he delegates
his policymaking authority to be of conforming political character.
Sheriffs, however, do not delegate to all deputies the discretion to
make law enforcement policy. Some deputies only implement policy.
Notwithstanding their ability to enforce the law, 0 7 not all deputies
may make law enforcement policy.
The distinction between these two levels of discretion is very
significant. Because of the autonomous nature of policing, deputies
and all other law enforcement officers have de facto discretionary
power to enforce the law.308 Sheriffs may handle this reality in several
different ways. They may choose to prescribe a literal policy to
enforce all laws fully.30 9 On the other hand, they may explicitly grant
front line deputies full discretion to decide which laws to enforce.
Between these extremes, sheriffs may prescribe standards for
enforcing laws under particular circumstances.3 10 In each of these
situations, the initial policy determination comes from the sheriff or a
subordinate chosen to decide policy questions.31 1 Each of these
situations also raises different concerns in the patronage context.
Under a policy of full enforcement, sheriffs are practically
foreclosed from arguing that political conformity is an essential job
requirement for deputies. Because discretion is nearly non-existent in
that deputies' political beliefs could be irrelevant to their employment. See Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 30, Harter v. Vernon, 139 N.C. App. 85, 532 S.E.2d 836 (2000),

appealdismissed, 353 N.C. 263, 546 S.E.2d 97 (2000), cert denied, 121 S.Ct. 1962 (2001).
305. See N.C. CONsT. art. VII. § 2; S. Ry. Co. v. Mecklenburg County, 231 N.C. 148,
151, 56 S.E.2d 438, 440 (1949) (noting that the sheriff holds the county's chief law
enforcement position). If this were not so, the constitution would not have provided for
their election. Indeed, the sheriff is the only local government official provided for by the
constitution. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17E-1 (1999). The sheriff has other powers besides law
enforcement, see PAUL KNEPPER, NORTH CAROLINA'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 87

(1999), but these generally are ministerial, such as serving process, or maintenance of the
county jail. Id.
306. See Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1162.
307. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 52-53 (1975)

(discussing

enforcement at the patrol level).
308. Id at 165.
309. Id at 52.
310. Id. at 168-71.
311. For example, a sheriff may permit a chief deputy to craft policy for his
department.
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a full enforcement system, politics decrease in importance to the job.
A sheriff cannot assert that discretion exists while purporting to have
removed it. Political belief cannot affect a deputy's choice when he
merely implements a law enforcement policy in which he has no say.
But political conformity becomes more relevant when deputies
are given full discretion to enforce the law. When no departmental
standards exist for guidance, the deputy relies on his own decisions as
to who should be arrested and charged with crimes. Here the deputy
both implements and makes policy.312 As policy guidelines increase,
deputies' discretion decreases.
Similarly, with increased rank and tenure, deputies may receive
considerably more discretion. The chief deputy in a patrol division
certainly has more policymaking discretion than a front-line deputy.
Thus, political conformity's relevance to the job is a function of the
amount of discretion the deputy has.
Deputies' discretion and the breadth of enforcement guidelines
will vary between sheriffs' offices, and with those offices' size and the
particular county's law enforcement needs. The last two factors also
distinguish the duties of certain deputies from others. In North
Carolina, although the sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer of
the county,313 and retains this power throughout the county
jurisdiction, sheriffs' offices generally patrol and enforce the law only
in unincorporated areas of each county,314 and in municipalities
without police departments of their own.31 5

Sheriffs' offices vary between employment of six to several
hundred deputies.1 In large departments, where sheriffs perhaps
employ state-of-the-art technology and law enforcement methods,
sheriffs may find it difficult to defend a political conformity
requirement. On the other hand, in a small department with only a
few deputies, political conformity may take on real significance,
312. DAVIS, supra note 307, at 2.
313. S. Ry. Co. v. Mecklenburg County, 231 N.C. 148, 151, 56 S.E.2d 438, 440 (1949)
(noting that the sheriff holds the chief law enforcement position).
314. KNEPPER, supra note 305, at 88.
315. INST. OF Gov'T, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 765 (David M.
Lawrence & Warren Jake Wicker eds., 2d ed. 1995). In some counties, where law
enforcement has been consolidated into a county police department, the sheriff's office
plays a minor role in law enforcement. Id.
316. See MAPS GROUP, supra note 153, at 36-47.
317. See Wake County Sheriff's Office, at http:lwww.rtpnet.org/-wcso/sheriff.html
(last visited August 25, 2001) (identifying the office's technological capabilities) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). One cannot say, for example that Democrats make
better SWAT team members than Republicans. Cf. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518
(1980) (ridiculing the assertion that Democrats make better football coaches).
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especially where the citizenry views the deputies as directly speaking
on the sheriffs behalf. 18
In addition to levels of discretion, duties, ranks, and office size
that distinguish deputies from one another, the level of abstraction
from political belief that formed the basis for a patronage termination
also may prove a relevant factor in the inquiry. Anything from pure
ideology, to one's registration as a Republican or a Democrat, 19 to
concrete support for a particular candidate 320 or agenda may provide
the basis for a patronage discharge. Each item on the spectrum has a
different level of relevance to a deputy's job performance. For
example, a deputy's belief that laws prohibiting the use and
possession of marijuana should be abolished is highly relevant to his
performance as a law enforcement officer. Although the deputy is
entitled to such belief, the sheriff may seriously question his ability to
enforce those laws.
Abstract beliefs in Democratic or Republican ideals seem to
have less relevance to law enforcement. The state constitution
presumes political ideology's significance with respect to sheriffs,
however.3 21 Relevance with respect to deputies may follow, especially
in instances where the department is small, where the deputy's rank
requires a degree of policymaking, or where the sheriff has
established a community-oriented policing strategy.322

Active

opposition against the sheriff's election or current support for another
candidate changes the inquiry as well. Loyalty to the sheriff is an
essential quality for a deputy.323 The sheriff should be entitled to

some measure of control regarding employment of inferiors who
question his entitlement to the office. A different problem arises
when the deputy chooses to remain neutral in an election, or refuses

318. Cf. Powell v. N.C. Dept. of Transp., 347 N.C. 614, 625, 499 S.E.2d 180, 186 (1998)
(noting that a governor's spokesperson's duty involved serving as "his eyes and ears").
But cf. Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1022-23 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that the
size of the sheriff's office is irrelevant in determining the propriety of affiliation as an
employment factor).
319. E.g., Branti, 445 U.S. at 509-10 (discussing Democratic county public defender's
threatened discharge of assistants solely because they were Republican).
320. E.g., Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1210, 1218 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying
Elrod-Branti to deputy who displayed a bumper sticker in support of the candidate
opposing the incumbent sheriff).
321. N.C. CONsT. art. VII, § 2 (providing for a sheriff's election).
322. For a general description of community oriented policing, see Carl B. Klockars,
The Rhetoric of Community Policing, in THE POLICE AND SOCIETY: TOUCHSTONE
READINGS 427,434-43 (Victor E. Kappeler ed., 2d ed. 1999).
323. Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
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to support the sheriff's campaign actively.324 A requirement of
outward political support comes closest to actual compulsion of
belief.325 In any event, section 153A-99 seems to prohibit actions such
as compulsory campaign funding.2 6
These significant differences in the levels of rights exercised,
levels of discretion, duties, ranks, and office sizes demonstrate the
futility of a categorical rule rejecting all patronage claims by deputies.
In some instances, political conformity simply bears no relevance to a
deputy's job. But that reality does not imply that patronage is always
improper. Jenkins may have been decided correctly in regard to the
deputies before the court, but that does not dictate that the decision
should apply with respect to all the diverse deputies in North
Carolina. Given its connection with freedom of speech, freedom of
political belief warrants an individual approach to patronage cases by
the state courts of North Carolina.
CONCLUSION

In light of the ruling in Jenkins v. Medford that all North
Carolina deputies are subject to patronage discharge, 3 7 considerable
need exists to establish what North Carolina state law says about
deputies' rights. The United States Supreme Court's rulings on
patronage and public employee freedom of speech seem to confuse
the courts and lead to conflicting opinions as to whether deputy
sheriffs properly are subject to discharge for political reasons. 321
North Carolina statutory law appears to give deputies at least some
protection from political patronage practices, but its protection is
limited.3 9 Given this limited protection, deputies must rely on the
North Carolina State Constitution's Declaration of Rights to protect
their liberties with respect to patronage.33 0 In determining deputies'
rights, courts should remember the individual nature of each deputy's
duties and avoid declaring a categorical denial of protection from

324. E.g., Knight v. Vernon, 214 F. Supp. 544, 547 (2000) (en banc) (describing sheriff's
employees who remained politically neutral).
325. Cf W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that
compulsory flag salutes in elementary schools are unconstitutional).
326. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-99(c) (1999).
327. 119 F.3d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
328. See supra notes 86-126.
329. See supra notes 129-190.
330. See supra notes 191-254.
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patronage.3 3' Only then will the Declaration of Rights be such a
"great bulwark[] of liberty '332
MICHAEL PATRICK BURKE

331. See supra notes 254-281.
332. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14.

